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NOTES
SMALL TOWN, INC.: MISCHIEF AT THE
MARGINS OF MUNICIPAL INCORPORATION
Robert L. Bentlyewski*
When a state creates a municipality or alters the boundaries of an existing
one, there usually is little to no opportunity for judicial review of the decision.
Under the centuries-old rule of construction known as Dillon’s Rule, courts
consider municipal boundary making to be strictly a political matter best left
to state legislatures. This sweeping deference creates opportunities for
special interests or politically powerful communities to segregate towns and
schools, isolate vulnerable communities, or otherwise manipulate
boundaries to hoard the benefits of local government. Courts will only
intervene and deem an incorporation void if the action brazenly violates a
constitutional protection or state incorporation law.
This Note examines some of the extreme situations in which courts may
look beyond Dillon’s Rule and stop problematic incorporations. The
threshold for judicial intervention is so high that populations can suffer
significant injustice with no opportunity for recourse. This Note recommends
that states enact more comprehensive incorporation laws that establish clear
and mandatory incorporation procedures, set substantive requirements for
what services municipalities must be able to provide, and save room for
judicial review. Throughout, this Note uses the Borough of Victory Gardens,
New Jersey, as a case study.
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INTRODUCTION
The United States is one country, divided into fifty states, split between
3031 counties,1 broken down into 38,779 towns,2 with 51,296 special
The centuries-long
government districts scattered around them.3
proliferation of miniature governments has turned the nation into a web of
overlapping, sometimes redundant, and sometimes warring4 fiefdoms. But
take a magnifying glass to any political map and you will find little towns
that—although you have never heard of them—have rich local histories and
fascinating founding impetuses.
Just ask the people of Georgetown, Colorado. When the territorial
Colorado legislature wanted to give some order to the formation of roughand-tumble mining boomtowns during the Pike’s Peak Gold Rush of the
1860s, it created haphazard town governments in an attempt to civilize

1. This figure includes Louisiana’s parishes and Alaska’s boroughs, which are their
equivalents of counties. See County, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/
topic/county [https://perma.cc/P92X-LMF8] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021).
2. This Note uses “town” and “municipality” interchangeably to refer to all incorporated
subcounty, general purpose governments.
3. Local Governments by Type and State:
2017, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2017/econ/gus/2017-governments.html
[https://perma.cc/DY8S-89EY] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021). The figures are current as of 2017
and contained in the document titled “COG2017_CG1700ORG02_Data.”
4. See, e.g., City of New Bedford v. New Bedford, Woods Hole, Martha’s Vineyard &
Nantucket S.S. Auth., 107 N.E.2d 513, 514–16 (Mass. 1952) (describing squabbling between
the City of New Bedford and a public steamship authority over whether the authority, which
had “New Bedford” in its name, had to include the city in its ferry route to Martha’s Vineyard).
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populations of outlaws and prospectors.5 Once incorporated, these towns,
badly in need of discipline, would each be governed by an elected “police
judge,” instead of a mayor.6 The territorial governors likely expected these
boomtowns to quickly turn to ghost towns after the mines were tapped out,
as was the norm,7 but Georgetown defied this expectation. Georgetown
residents still elect a police judge every two years,8 the only municipality in
Colorado still operating under a territorial charter.9 Although police judges
are perhaps not as concerned with highwaymen raiding their constituents’
stagecoaches these days, the elections are still colorful affairs.10
Roughly one hundred miles northeast of Georgetown, a frontiersman
named Tom Nunn once came across a nightmare of a sight: a rail bridge had
caught fire, and a train was heading right toward it.11 He frantically waved
at the conductor and alerted him to the danger, saving the lives of the
passengers and crew.12 The Union Pacific Railroad Company was so grateful
that it set aside a square mile of land it owned and named it after Tom.13
Over a century later, the town of Nunn, Colorado, still stands as an
independent municipality.14
Towns like these and countless others are the products of a nationwide
approach to public administration that gives great deference to state
governments, which can carve their lands into municipalities however they
see fit.15 But for every amusing tale preserved by the creation of municipal
boundaries, there is a local government facing perpetual challenges due to
5. Until then, only quasi-judicial “miners’ courts” existed to govern local affairs and
protect miners’ gold claims. See MARSHALL SPRAGUE, COLORADO: A HISTORY xii–xiii (1984);
see also David B. Kopel, The Right to Arms in Nineteenth Century Colorado, 95 DENV. L.
REV. 329, 361 (2018) (explaining that the rough governing bodies approximating town
governments were called “miner’s districts,” and the courts were also known as “people’s
courts”).
6. See SPRAGUE, supra note 5, at xii–xiii.
7. Large fires were also common causes for abandonment. See Georgetown, ENCYC.
BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/place/Georgetown-Colorado [https://perma.cc/
3PXA-VVFB] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021).
8. The town recently appointed an honorary mayor, however. He is a four-year-old
Bernese mountain dog named Parker. Honorary Mayor of Georgetown, Colorado: Parker the
Snow Dog, GEORGETOWN, COLO., https://Georgetown-colorado.org/mayor-of-georgetownparker [https://perma.cc/WBY4-T63H] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021).
9. COLO. MUN. LEAGUE, COLORADO MUNICIPAL CANDIDATE GUIDE 5 (2019),
https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/sites/default/files/atoms/files/2019-municipal-candidateguide.pdf [https://perma.cc/UK4D-LUXE].
10. Georgetown made national news in 2002 after an exotic dancer won its election for
police judge. Upon taking office, sensing waning support, she faked an attempt on her life.
Voters removed her in a recall election but not before she leveraged her moment of fame to
earn a featured spot in Playboy. See Kimberley Sevcik, Too Wild for the West, GUARDIAN
(Apr. 29, 2002, 9:42 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/apr/30/gender.uk
[https://perma.cc/SYU8-Y5FH].
11. See Town of Nunn History, TOWN OF NUNN, COLO., http://www.nunncolorado.com/
tcv_32.html [https://perma.cc/KWP9-7Z98] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021).
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See infra Part II.B (describing the municipal incorporation process).
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shortsighted or unscrupulous town planning. For example, although Nunn’s
dirt roads and small-town charm make it look like something out of a John
Mellencamp music video, its tiny tax base makes it difficult to fund
municipal services with any self-sufficiency.16 The revenue starved town
heavily depends on fining out-of-town drivers to make ends meet, relying on
speeding tickets on Interstate 85 to cover 40 percent of its budget.17
After centuries of municipal accretion, the United States saw a new trend
emerge around the year 2000, which gathered steam after the 2008 financial
crisis: municipalities started dissolving almost as frequently as new ones
were incorporating.18 Hard financial times, coupled with a growing distrust
of government and innumerable locality-specific concerns, caused town
populations to lose faith in their local governments and seek to do away with
them altogether.19 With COVID-19 expected to reduce state and local tax
revenue by $500 billion nationwide by the end of 2022,20 the coming years
are likely to be far more of a strain on municipalities than even the hardest
years of the post-2008 recession, thus priming the country for further turmoil.
Additionally, the United States is more politically divided along racial lines
than ever before in its history.21 Political scientists Steven Levitsky and
Daniel Ziblatt suggest that the upswing in divisiveness and an embrace of
extremism threaten to make the states, long thought of as “laboratories of
democracy,” into “laboratories of authoritarianism.”22 If states are
laboratories, counties are the beakers and towns are the test tubes.
When state legislatures or influential groups of citizens—motivated by any
combination of racial, nativist, or political animus—seek to redraw
municipal boundaries to reallocate scarce resources away from groups they
disfavor, there is little courts can do to stop them.23 Such fragmentations and
16. In fiscal year 2017, $299,972 of Nunn’s $744,441 in general fund revenue came from
fines. See Mike Maciag, Addicted to Fines: A Special Report, GOVERNING (Aug. 21, 2019),
https://www.governing.com/topics/finance/fine-fee-revenues-special-report.html#map
[https://perma.cc/H5SE-QVHJ] (Zoom in on Colorado in the interactive map; Nunn is the
northernmost town labeled in Colorado.).
17. See id.
18. Michelle Wilde Anderson, Dissolving Cities, 121 YALE L.J. 1364, 1366 (2012) (“At
least 130 cities have dissolved since 2000—nearly as many as incorporated during that same
period.”).
19. See Sarah Mervosh, They Wanted to Save Their 119-Year-Old Village. So They Got
Rid of It., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/26/us/amelia-ohiodissolve.html [https://perma.cc/L5WQ-LZK5].
20. See Louise Sheiner & Sophia Campbell, How Much Is COVID-19 Hurting State and
Local Revenues?, BROOKINGS INST. (Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/upfront/2020/09/24/how-much-is-covid-19-hurting-state-and-local-revenues/
[https://perma.cc/A4LA-UQCN].
21. Over the United States’s history, Republicans were generally the favored party of
Black Americans due to their opposition to slavery, and the city-centric Democrats were the
favored party of immigrants. See JAMES A. MORONE, REPUBLIC OF WRATH: HOW AMERICAN
POLITICS TURNED TRIBAL, FROM GEORGE WASHINGTON TO DONALD TRUMP 3 (2020). A recent
and unprecedented realignment has made it so that “[f]or the first time, all the so-called
minorities are on one side.” Id.
22. Id. at 24.
23. See infra Part III (describing the limited circumstances under which courts may
intervene in incorporations).
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reallocations commonly took place during the rapid spread of suburban
sprawl after World War II24 and have recently accelerated.25 Left unchecked,
these divisions can solidify and expand segregation, widen wealth and
educational disparities, and socially balkanize communities along racial and
other lines.26 Despite these grave policy consequences, the law has evolved
little since the time of Wild West governance from which Georgetown
emerged.27
Americans have widely shared expectations for how a legitimate,
democratic government should treat them. Accepted norms include: the
opportunity to participate in decision-making; the ability to hold
representatives accountable for their decisions; reasonably efficient
government administration; and the fair distribution of public goods and
services, including to minority populations.28 The constitutions and laws of
the federal and state governments are meant to compel governments to meet
these democratic expectations, but the unwieldy realm of municipal
incorporation creates ample opportunities for ill-intentioned actors to subvert
such norms.29 This Note looks at some of the very few ways courts can
intervene to stop a town from forming when malfeasance or egregious
misfeasance threaten to undermine democratic governance and divide
communities along racial, political, socioeconomic, or otherwise arbitrary
lines.
The laws and circumstances under which states divide into towns vary so
widely that framing the issue in general terms would be futile: what may be
unconstitutional under Kentucky’s state constitution may be standard
operating procedure in Oregon, and incorporation issues long settled in
Florida may have never reached a courtroom in Hawaii, which does not

24. See infra Part I (discussing how a New Jersey community broke apart after the
construction of a war-related housing project influenced local politics).
25. A wealthier area of East Baton Rouge Parish in Louisiana tried to break away into its
own town recently but failed to garner enough support to survive a referendum. See Terry L.
Jones, Voters in Southeast East Baton Rouge Parish Say ‘Yes’ to St. George, ADVOCATE (Oct.
12, 2019, 9:30 PM), https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/article_4c842ecc-ec4311e9-bf9c-7f1c0b207650.html [https://perma.cc/3SKF-VYP7]. Residents tried again, this
time removing more Black residents from the proposed city limits, and the measure narrowly
passed. See id. The neighborhood is now the significantly less diverse City of St. George. See
id. In Anniston, Alabama, residents of the town’s whiter, wealthier fourth ward are attempting
to leave the predominantly Black town of Anniston and join a neighboring town. See Janae
Pierre, Annexit: The Push to Deannex Parts of Anniston into Oxford, WBHM (Aug. 20, 2019),
https://wbhm.org/feature/2019/annexit-the-push-to-deannex-parts-of-anniston-into-oxford
[https://perma.cc/G339-7K8U].
26. These were the direct effects of the municipal incorporation described in the case
study below. See infra Part IV.A.
27. Compare infra Part II.A (detailing the predominant nineteenth-century legal theory
termed “Dillon’s Rule”), with Bragg Hill Corp. v. City of Fredericksburg, 831 S.E.2d 483,
489–90 (Va. 2019) (applying Dillon’s Rule strictly and citing it by name).
28. Joseph P. Viteritti, Municipal Home Rule and the Conditions of Justifiable Secession,
23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1, 30–31 (1995) (citing M. Stephen Weatherford, Measuring Political
Legitimacy, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 149, 149–50 (1992)).
29. See infra Parts III.A–B (describing various suspect incorporations).
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divide governments lower than the county level.30 Instead, this Note will
focus on the woeful creation of a single town—the Borough of Victory
Gardens, New Jersey—and use that incorporation as a lens through which to
examine the limited opportunities for redress, even for brazen violations of
democratic norms. At least one leading scholar has called for an increased
use of case studies in analyzing the costs and benefits of boundary changes
within their hyperlocal sociopolitical contexts,31 and this Note largely uses
such case studies to analyze the limits of judicial review of those changes.
Part I of this Note tells the story of Victory Gardens’s incorporation. Part
II provides background on the basic structure of municipal corporations and
incorporation as a legal device. Part III describes some of the few
extraordinary situations in which courts can intervene in a municipal
incorporation. Part IV demonstrates how unlikely it was for there to be a
legal remedy available to the residents of Victory Gardens and suggests
statutory solutions to prevent similar antidemocratic transgressions from
happening again.
I. VICTORY GARDENS, NEW JERSEY: A CASE STUDY
Shortly after the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, the federal government
constructed a housing project in the hills of northern New Jersey to house
workers at the country’s largest explosives manufacturer, the U.S. Army’s
Picatinny Arsenal.32 The federal government constructed the project on just
over one-tenth of one square mile of hilly land in Randolph Township that
was likely the site of a disused farm.33 The project, named Victory
Gardens,34 consisted of bare cinder block, bungalow-like dormitories mostly
built around a single circular road.35 Most of the workers who moved into
the project were not local residents; many moved in from Pennsylvania and
30. Even urban Honolulu is just a city-like county. There are no towns at all in Hawaii.
See
About
State
Government,
HAW.
DEP’T
OF
BUDGET
&
FIN.,
https://budget.hawaii.gov/budget/state-of-hawaii-background-information/#:~:text=There%
20are%20no%20independent%20or,parts%20of%20the%20United%20States
[https://perma.cc/2BE2-74LG] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021) (“There are no independent or
separate cities or other municipalities, school districts or townships. The State government of
Hawai’i has total responsibility for many functions that are performed by or shared by local
governments in most other parts of the United States.”).
31. See Michelle Wilde Anderson, Mapped out of Local Democracy, 62 STAN. L. REV.
931, 945–46, 945 n.46 (2010).
32. See PATRICK J. OWENS, PICATINNY: THE FIRST CENTURY 219–21 (2017).
33. See To Vote on Gardens, DOVER ADVANCE, Sept. 17, 1951, at 1 (quoting the lawyer
representing the project’s residents as saying, “it should be remembered that before Victory
Gardens was developed that area was an abandoned farm, probably paying $100 in taxes”).
34. The name is likely a reference to the home gardens grown to aid the war effort during
World War II, but it may also have been a tongue-in-cheek insult. The euphemism for the
low-cost, low-quality building materials used in defense projects like Victory Gardens at that
time was “victory building materials.” See Kristin M. Szylvian, The Federal Housing Program
During World War II, in FROM TENEMENTS TO THE TAYLOR HOMES 121, 131 (John F. Bauman
et al. eds., 2000).
35. See MORRIS CNTY. HERITAGE COMM’N, MORRIS COUNTY CULTURAL RESOURCES
SURVEY (1988) (describing Victory Gardens’s architecture). This report, informally known
as the “Acroterion report,” is held at the Morris County Library.
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others from all over the country.36 Although it bore no official whites-only
designation, it was likely a segregated all-white project in accordance with
the federal government’s strict policy against integrated defense housing at
the time.37
Political strife existed from the start between the residents of the project—
who were mostly union Democrats—and the rest of Randolph’s solidly
Republican population.38 In 1951, a Wall Street investor named Charles
Brundage, whose personal landholdings in Randolph significantly exceeded
the size of Victory Gardens39 and who had a very particular, passionate drive
to remove all bungalows from the town,40 enlisted the help of Randolph’s
mayor41 to petition the legislature to remove the project from Randolph’s
borders and incorporate it as its own municipality.42 That March, the local
state senator, a powerful figure in the state Republican Party,43 wrote a bill
to incorporate Victory Gardens, which passed both Republican-controlled
chambers of the legislature with just under two-thirds approval in each.44

36. See Michael Valkys, ‘Poor Orphan’ of Morris Fights to Survive, DAILY REC., Jan. 30,
1995, at A5.
37. When the National Housing Agency (NHA) built Victory Gardens, Black Americans
were only permitted to live in the 11 percent of defense-related housing the NHA specifically
reserved for them. See Szylvian, supra note 34, at 131.
38. See Jersey Township Seeking ‘Divorce,’ N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1951, at 35.
39. Brundage was a partner in the investment firm of Brundage, Story & Rose. See
Charles Edwin Brundage Investment Counselor, 77, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 29, 1972, at 28. He and
his wife donated over 500 acres of land for use as a park and named it after their favorite
milkman. See James Andrews Memorial County Park, MORRIS CNTY. PARK COMM’N,
https://www.morrisparks.net/index.php/parks/james-andrews-memorial-park/
[https://
perma.cc/8QMY-9HUV] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021). The couple additionally donated land to
form Brundage Park, covering 232 acres today. See About Our Parks, TWP. OF RANDOLPH,
N.J., https://www.randolphnj.org/parks_and_recreation/parks_about [https://perma.cc/E9B8EPEG] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021). Victory Gardens covers ninety-four acres. See War Homes
Voted Out of Township, HERALD-NEWS, Sept. 19, 1951, at 1.
40. Brundage served as the chairman of Randolph’s planning board in the early 1950s.
See Better Zoning Steps Outlined, COURIER-NEWS, Apr. 15, 1950, at 7. Brundage once sued
in his capacity as a private citizen in an attempt to shut down the all-Jewish bungalow colonies
that attracted a largely Orthodox community to Randolph each summer, eventually losing a
yearslong legal battle. See Brundage v. Township of Randolph, 148 A.2d 841, 842–45 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1959).
41. Robert Crowley’s official title was “Chairman of the Randolph Township
Committee,” but the role was understood to be equivalent to that of a mayor. See Robert
Crowley, 87, Former Mayor of Randolph Township, DAILY REC., Jul. 30, 1981, at 2.
42. See Robert G. Geelan, The Bitter Birth of Randolph’s Orphan, RANDOLPH REP., Apr.
19, 1979, at 9 (stating that Brundage led the “Citizens of Randolph” advocacy group that
fought for the removal of Victory Gardens).
43. State Senator David Young III became the majority leader the following year. See
GOP Group to Fete Hannold as State Senate President, COURIER-POST, Jan. 3, 1952, at 32.
44. See Senators Approve Bill on Gardens Separation, DOVER ADVANCE, Mar. 22, 1951,
at 1 (approving the bill 12 to 7—a 63 percent majority); see also Victory Gardens Separation
Plan Passes Assembly, DOVER ADVANCE, Apr. 5, 1951, at 1 (approving the plan 32 to 18—a
64 percent majority).
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The state scheduled a September referendum for locals to vote on the
incorporation,45 and advocates for both sides started campaigning.46
Pro-incorporation forces, now led by the mayor, argued that the federal
government was failing to pay promised subsidies to cover education
expenses for Victory Gardens’s schoolchildren, placing the burden squarely
on Randolph’s taxpayers.47 The director of the federal Public Housing
Authority’s (PHA) New York division publicly called Randolph’s
accounting practices “fanciful and erratic.”48 The director suggested that the
town government, which had presented widely inconsistent cost estimates for
how much it spent on Victory Gardens’s schoolchildren, had actually turned
a profit off of federal subsidies.49 He further attested that he and a PHA
lawyer had met with Randolph officials just a few months earlier to make
sure funding was adequate, and neither the mayor nor any other official had
raised a complaint.50 Nonetheless, Randolph’s mayor and town auditor told
a crowd that Randolph residents’ school-related taxes would be cut in half if
the project were excised from their town.51 The statement was an abject lie.52
The mayor also warned that the project would become the biggest “slum” in
the area once the federal government stopped managing it.53 As the word
“slum” carried clear racial implications,54 this may have played into an antiintegrationist sentiment present in the area.55

45. See Victory Gardens Referendum Date Is September 18, DOVER ADVANCE, Jul. 23,
1951, at 1.
46. See Victory Gardens Residents to Fight Against Separation, DOVER ADVANCE, Jul. 5,
1951, at 1.
47. See Crowley Says Victory Gardens Project Opposed from Start, DOVER ADVANCE,
Aug. 13, 1951, at 1. In the speech described in this article, the mayor also asserted that the
people living in Victory Gardens were not just factory workers but also “professional men”
taking advantage of the subsidized housing. Id. No historical account supports that assertion.
48. Gardens Expense to Township Is Denied by Federal Official, DOVER ADVANCE, Mar.
26, 1951, at 1.
49. See id.
50. See id. (detailing meetings between the PHA and Randolph’s township committee on
December 28, 1950, and January 12, 1951).
51. See Decision Due Tuesday on Separation Issue, DOVER ADVANCE, Sept. 13, 1951, at
1.
52. The next year, Randolph’s taxes only went down by 1 percent. N.J. DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIVISION OF TAXATION 74 (1952),
https://dspace.njstatelib.org/xmlui/handle/10929/26935
[https://perma.cc/X4QV-NYKB]
(indicating a 1951 tax rate of 7.74 percent and a 1952 rate of 7.68 percent).
53. See Crowley Says Victory Gardens Project Opposed from Start, supra note 47.
54. See generally Arnold R. Hirsch, Searching for a “Sound Negro Policy”: A Racial
Agenda for the Housing Acts of 1949 and 1954, 11 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 393 (2000)
(describing how opponents of federal urban renewal programs at this time considered “slum”
a pejorative used to indicate the Blackness of a neighborhood).
55. The local newspaper’s editorial pages from that year illustrate the regressive ethos.
See, e.g., Editorial, America Is Scared, DOVER ADVANCE, Apr. 19, 1951, at 2 (comparing
Black Americans moving into white areas to the “barbaric hordes” that invaded and destroyed
the empires of antiquity); Editorial, Confederate Flags, DOVER ADVANCE, Sept. 17, 1951, at
4 (celebrating sightings of Confederate flags in the area and suggesting a return to
Confederate-style politics, wishing for no federal government interference in local
government).
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The project’s anti-incorporation advocates faced opposition at every turn,
with the Randolph government refusing to allow them to use a sound truck
to mobilize voters,56 limiting their use of public halls for meetings,57 and
refusing to participate in discussions with project residents.58 The regional
PHA director complained in a public statement that he had asked to give a
presentation to explain how the budget figures the mayor presented were
“inflated, unjustified, and misleading,” and although the Brundage-led
planning committee had told the public that they had invited the director to
do so, he had never actually received an invitation.59
On September 18, the referendum passed 735 to 711, with project residents
voting against the measure 483 to 30.60 The state incorporated a ninety-fouracre municipality over the opposition of 94 percent of its residents.61
Because school districts are separate corporate entities from municipalities,
a second referendum was held on December 4 to decide whether Victory
Gardens should be removed from the Randolph school district and given its
own board of education.62 That measure passed 327 to 10, with Victory
Gardens residents not allowed to vote in the referendum.63
Victory Gardens residents unsuccessfully challenged the referendums in
court, claiming: (1) ineligible voters had cast ballots, (2) they had received
insufficient notice because the ballot question was confusingly worded, (3)
notice had been insufficient because Randolph failed to distribute sample
ballots, and (4) absentee ballots had not been provided for registered voters
from the project who were serving in the Korean War.64 The only claim that
the judge felt could prevent the incorporation from proceeding was the charge
of ineligible voters casting ballots.65 After asking the project’s lawyer to
return with specific names of voters who had cast illegal ballots, the judge66

56. Victory Gardens Asks Forum, Use of Sound Truck, DOVER ADVANCE, Aug. 6, 1951,
at 1.
57. Id.
58. The mayor said he would not attend a public meeting because it would be too
“political.” Democratic League Holds Gardens Protest Meeting, DOVER ADVANCE, Sept. 4,
1951, at 1. The leader of the anti-incorporation movement said, “Every suggestion of the
[Victory Gardens] residents was turned down.” Id.
59. Kervick Cites Payment, VG School Pupils, DOVER ADVANCE, Sept. 17, 1951, at 1.
60. ‘Gardens’ Is Ousted, 735–711, DOVER ADVANCE, Sept. 20, 1951, at 1.
61. See War Homes Voted Out of Township, supra note 39, at 1.
62. See Second Election Looms up at VG; School—This Time, DOVER ADVANCE, Nov. 5,
1951, at 1.
63. See Set Up School District: Victory Gardens Again Voted Out by Randolph, DOVER
ADVANCE, Dec. 6, 1951, at 1.
64. See Geelan, supra note 42, at 9.
65. See Judge Dismisses 3 of 4 Allegations, V.G. Referendum, DOVER ADVANCE, Oct. 22,
1951, at 1.
66. Judge Donald M. Waesche was a Democrat whose appointment to the bench was
fiercely opposed by senate Democrats in the minority. See Waesche an Issue, CENT. N.J. HOME
NEWS, Feb. 12, 1949, at 2. He was also the attorney on the losing side of an important decision
in which the state supreme court clarified the limits of New Jersey municipalities’
independence and powers. See Hart v. Teaneck, 50 A.2d 856, 857 (N.J. 1947).
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dismissed all their complaints.67 Victory Gardens—a creation of the state
legislature and the citizens of Randolph—has thus stood independently for
seven decades. Never given additional land by the legislature, 0.15 squaremile Victory Gardens has survived through recessions and very hard times,
despite not having schools, a police department, a library, developable land,
or many of the basic elements one expects to find in a town.68
Years later, a New Jersey General Assembly Speaker, Alan Karcher, called
the incorporation of Victory Gardens “one of the sadder moments of the
state’s history.”69 Victory Gardens government leaders and those writing
about its history have called the town an “orphan” of the state government.70
Its incorporation violated various of the aforementioned democratic norms,71
with an added layer of ugliness from the lies the local government told.72
However, despite these transgressions, there likely was and still is no legal
remedy available to the residents of Victory Gardens. To explain this lack of
redress, Part II covers the formation of municipalities and their legal
definition, and Parts III and IV show when courts can intervene in the
drawing of municipal boundaries.
II. MAKING A MUNICIPALITY
Rather than rely on their citizens to figure out how to order and preserve
their ways of life, state governments create municipalities to perform those
functions as more formal political and corporate bodies.73
The
Massachusetts Constitution eloquently describes a political body as “a social
compact, by which the whole people covenants with each citizen, and each
citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for
the common good.”74 But at least since the times of the Greek polis, political
bodies have also been defined by their corporate characteristics,75 and state
legislatures set the pathways to incorporation for today’s municipalities. Part
II.A explores the relationship between municipalities and their state
legislatures, and Part II.B discusses the legal mechanisms with which
municipal corporations can be created.
67. See Judge Dismisses 3 of 4 Allegations, V.G. Referendum, supra note 65. The local
media did not cover the court’s disposition of the fourth allegation, but it presumably was
unsuccessful.
68. See BOROUGH OF VICTORY GARDENS, http://www.victorygardensnj.gov
[https://perma.cc/X8WB-69Z2] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021) (containing information on the
municipal services Victory Gardens provides).
69. ALAN J. KARCHER, NEW JERSEY’S MULTIPLE MUNICIPAL MADNESS 126–27 (1998).
70. See, e.g., id. at 126; Geelan, supra note 42; Valkys, supra note 36.
71. See Viteritti, supra note 28, at 30–31.
72. See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text.
73. See Counts v. Morrison-Knudsen, Inc., 663 S.W.2d 357, 362 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (“A
city functions as a body politic, as an organ of government, and also as a body corporate, an
artificial personality or corporation.”).
74. MASS. CONST. pmbl.
75. See Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1126 (1980)
(“[A]ll powerful local units, whether Greek cities, medieval towns or New England towns,
combined their ‘political’ identity with other forms of religious or fraternal cohesion or
economic power.”).
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A. Creature of the State Legislature
In America, state governments ultimately control their municipalities.
State legislatures can design, create, alter, and abolish towns as they see fit.76
Perhaps the most common and enduring observation about municipalities’
subordinate legal condition is that they are “creatures of” state legislation.77
Although the image of a “creature” connotes the creation of a separate,
subordinate being, municipalities have interchangeably been described as
weak “departments” of their states’ governments78 and mere
“instrumentalities” of those governments, designed to perform specific state
functions and no more.79
In his treatise and opinions, the nineteenth-century Iowa jurist John F.
Dillon articulated local government’s creature status so clearly that the truism
is now called Dillon’s Rule.80 From the bench of the Iowa Supreme Court,
Dillon wrote:
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and
rights wholly from, the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life,
without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. If it may
destroy, it may abridge and control. . . . [Municipalities] are, so to phrase
it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature.81

In addition to establishing municipalities’ position subordinate to state
governments, Dillon’s Rule is also a canon of construction suggesting that
courts should construe questions of power distribution narrowly against
municipalities and residents and broadly in favor of states.82 If a court
76. City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids & Mo. River R.R. Co., 24 Iowa 455, 475 (1868),
superseded by constitutional amendment, IOWA CONST. art. III, § 38A, as recognized in Berent
v. City of Iowa City, 738 N.W.2d 193 (Iowa 2007). But see infra Part II.C (discussing the
self-governance powers preserved in home rule statutes and constitutional provisions).
77. See, e.g., Shirk v. City of Lancaster, 169 A. 557, 559 (Pa. 1933) (“Municipal
corporations are creatures of the state, created, governed, and abolished at its will.”); K N
Energy, Inc. v. City of Casper, 755 P.2d 207, 210 (Wyo. 1988) (“Municipalities, being
creatures of the state, have no inherent powers but possess only the authority conferred by the
legislature.”).
78. See, e.g., City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 187 (1923) (“A municipality
is merely a department of the state, and the state may withhold, grant or withdraw powers and
privileges as it sees fit.”); Barnes v. District of Columbia, 91 U.S. 540, 544 (1875) (“A
municipal corporation . . . is but a department of the State.”).
79. See, e.g., In re Las Vegas Monorail Co., 429 B.R. 770, 796 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2010)
(explaining that whether an entity is an “instrumentality of the state” is key in assessing if it
is a “municipality” under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code); Burch v. Hardwicke, 71 Va. (1 Gratt.)
24, 32 (Va. 1878) (“[Municipalities] are instrumentalities of the government acting under
delegated powers . . . .”).
80. See Smith v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 641 F.3d 197, 218 n.10 (6th Cir.
2011) (explaining Dillon’s Rule and its place in contemporary Tennessee law).
81. Cedar Rapids, 24 Iowa at 475.
82. See NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, PRINCIPLES OF HOME RULE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 10
n.6
(2020),
https://www.nlc.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Home-Rule-PrinciplesReportWEB-2-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/VE3T-YYSN]; see also Bragg Hill Corp. v. City of
Fredericksburg, 831 S.E.2d 483, 489 (Va. 2019) (“The Dillon Rule of strict construction
controls our determination of the powers of local governing bodies.” (quoting Marble Techs.,
Inc. v. Hampton, 690 S.E.2d 84, 88 (Va. 2010))).
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perceives that a state legislature’s will was to incorporate a municipality or
alter its powers, it will give the state the benefit of the doubt, even if the legal
validity of the action is questionable.83
Although state legislatures have expansive powers to create municipal
governments, they have very limited authority to delegate any of that power
to other branches.84 When legislatures have attempted to include courts in
the incorporation process to serve as a check on the legislatures, courts
themselves have struck down the delegations. For example, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court called incorporation “emphatically a question of public
policy and statecraft” and declared that the soundness of an incorporation
decision was “not in any sense a judicial question.”85 When the Tennessee
legislature gave its circuit courts the job of approving or denying all requests
for incorporation—for both public and private corporations—as a way to
save time in the legislature, the state supreme court forbade it.86 Finding the
legislature’s power to form corporations to be “one of the attributes of the
supreme power which they represent,” the Tennessee court held that the
power was wholly nondelegable.87 However, statutes that explicitly require
that incorporations be “reasonable” can provide courts with the power to
exercise discretion and have a meaningful say in the process.88
Just as judiciaries cannot encroach on the legislative domain of
incorporation, neither can executives. When the Louisiana governor
attempted to incorporate a town by decree, the state supreme court held that
he was acting outside his executive function, instead exercising an improper
delegation of legislative power.89
Legislatures also cannot give the power of incorporation directly to the
people through referenda.90 Incorporations usually include a referendum at
83. See Durham v. Crutchfield, 578 S.W.2d 438, 441–42 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (finding
an incorporation proper even though the state failed to properly delineate the proposed town’s
boundaries as required under state law).
84. See State v. Armstrong, 35 Tenn. (1 Sneed) 634, 638 (1856) (holding that the state
constitution’s grant of authority over incorporating municipalities to the legislature “forbids
the exercise of this power by any other department of the government”).
85. The legislature had required that a circuit court confirm that all the territory in a
proposed municipality “ought justly to be included” before finalizing incorporations, a broad
judgment call. In re Village of North Milwaukee, 67 N.W. 1033, 1035–36 (Wis. 1896).
86. Armstrong, 35 Tenn. at 638.
87. Id. at 637–38. But see Wiseman v. Calvert, 59 S.E.2d 445, 453 (W. Va. 1950) (quoting
West v. W. Va. Fair Ass’n, 125 S.E. 353, 355 (W. Va. 1924)) (finding West Virginia courts
can have a role in the formal process of incorporation so long as it is purely administrative and
no judicial discretion is exercised).
88. See infra Part III.B.3 (discussing reasonableness requirements in incorporation).
89. State ex rel. Higgins v. Aicklen, 119 So. 425, 428 (La. 1928) (“The fact that the
proclamation declaring the village of Metairie Ridge incorporated was that of the Chief
Executive does not make the question in this case a political question, not reviewable by the
courts, for the Governor was not performing an executive function in issuing his proclamation.
He was acting under the same authority that any other agency to whom the Legislature might
have delegated the authority would have acted under.”).
90. See Pershing v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct., 181 P. 960, 962 (Nev. 1919) (“[T]he power which
the Legislature possesses to divide counties and apportion their common burdens is not
abridged, limited, restricted, or affected by the initiative and referendum . . . .”).
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some point in the process,91 but approval by an affected area’s inhabitants is
merely a condition precedent to the enactment of an incorporation statute; it
is not what legally drives the incorporation.92 The people may have the final
say, but they are merely exercising the limited rights that the legislature has
explicitly given them.
B. Incorporation: The Act of Creation
Town and city seals often contain the words “incorporated in” followed by
a year93 because a community cannot be recognized as a legal entity until it
is chartered as a municipal corporation.94 Incorporation is the creation of a
corporation, producing an entity with legal personhood.95 Municipal
corporations are corporations of a specific variety that exist only to promote
the public welfare and govern affairs within their fixed, relatively narrow
borders.96
Due to the old age of some U.S. municipalities and the complicated history
of different nations seizing and exchanging Native American land, many
American communities have assumed a corporate character under murky
circumstances.97 However, most towns in the United States followed more
direct paths to creation through the common mechanism of state-initiated
incorporation.98 Local governments today do not derive their authority from
an abstract presence of sovereignty, but rather they have exactly as much

91. See 1 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 3:81 (3d ed.
2020) (discussing incorporation referenda).
92. See id. § 3:35 (“Even where the consent of the people involved is required or any steps
must be taken by individuals before corporate existence begins, it is not from the persons who
consent or who take the steps that the corporation derives its existence.” (footnote omitted)).
93. See, e.g., CHICAGO, ILL., CODE ch. 1, art. 8, § 010 (2020) (requiring that the Chicago,
Illinois, seal contain the words “City Of Chicago; Incorporated 4th March, 1837”); MEDFORD,
MASS., CODE ch. 2, art. I, § 2-1(a) (2020) (requiring that the Medford, Massachusetts, seal
contain the words “Founded 1630: Incorporated a City 1892”).
94. Comm’rs of Laramie Cnty. v. Comm’rs of Albany Cnty., 92 U.S. 307, 308 (1875)
(“Counties, cities, and towns are municipal corporations, created by the authority of the
legislature; and they derive all their powers from the source of their creation, except where the
constitution of the State otherwise provides.”).
95. See Incorporation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
96. Comm’rs of Laramie Cnty., 92 U.S. at 308 (“[Towns are] usually invested with certain
subordinate legislative powers, to facilitate the due administration of their own internal affairs,
and to promote the general welfare of the municipality.”).
97. See Jake Sullivan, The Tenth Amendment and Local Government, 112 YALE L.J. 1935,
1939–40 (2003) (describing the evolution of local governments in the original colonies).
Original claims to local power in western states were equally murky. See Kopel, supra note 5,
at 362 (“Strictly speaking, the entire settlement of Colorado had been of questionable legality;
whatever lands were ceded by Indian treaties belonged to the federal government, which had
never enacted any law for transfer of title to settlers.”).
98. See Edward Q. Keasbey, New Jersey and the Great Corporations, 13 HARV. L. REV.
198, 205 (1899) (describing how most nineteenth-century incorporations were performed
through special legislation, but general enabling statutes had become the norm by the turn of
the twentieth century).
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power as was granted to them by their legislatures at the time of their
incorporations.99
When states begin breaking themselves into smaller administrative
districts, they first split up into counties, which double as geographic
subdivisions of states’ land and administrative subdivisions of states’
governments.100 States utilize counties in different ways: some use them
strictly for geographic demarcation, while others give them essential
government functions.101 Land within county borders is by default
considered unincorporated and governed by the county’s government until
town governments are incorporated within it.102 Although unincorporated
land is often inhabited and sometimes even urbanized,103 the general practice
is for states to leave their more rural sections unincorporated and incorporate
their more densely populated areas into municipalities.104
The traditional route to incorporation is for a state legislature to enact an
individual statute that specifically sets up an area as a municipal
corporation.105 These statutes, a variety of “special legislation,” detail the
town incorporation process.106 For example, the act that created Victory
Gardens identified the land to be included in painstaking detail, with
descriptions like: the boundary continues “north 22 degrees 35 minutes 45
seconds,” then “west 523.59 feet along a line of lands [owned by] Walter
Pitkin to an iron post.”107 The act also described how the referendum to
approve the separation must be conducted and provided the structure for the
Victory Gardens municipal government: a seven-person council that selects
one of its own members to be the mayor.108
99. See Hart v. Teaneck, 50 A.2d 856, 857 (N.J. 1947) (“A municipal corporation . . .
[has] no inherent jurisdiction to make laws, but is government of enumerated powers acting
by delegated authority which must be exercised in a reasonable manner. The power conferred
on municipal corporations by the State Legislature is limited; its exercise must be directed to
the protection of a basic interest of society . . . .”).
100. See County, supra note 1.
101. The classic example for the latter group is using county sheriffs as the principal law
enforcers within their county limits, rather than having a local police department led by a chief.
See FAQ, NAT’L SHERIFFS’ ASS’N, https://www.sheriffs.org/about-nsa/faq [https://perma.cc/
SY96-63G5] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021).
102. See Michelle Wilde Anderson, Cities Inside Out: Race, Poverty, and Exclusion at the
Urban Fringe, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1101 (2008).
103. Over one million people live in unincorporated areas in Miami-Dade County, Florida,
alone. See About Miami-Dade County, MIAMI-DADE CNTY., https://www.miamidade.gov/
global/disclaimer/about-miami-dade-county.page#:~:text=The%20areas%20of%20the%20
County,the%20largest%20in%20the%20nation [https://perma.cc/ZS2X-HNMA] (last visited
Jan. 27, 2021).
104. In some states, there are statutes forbidding incorporation in less developed areas. See,
e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-101(F) (2020) (“An area to be incorporated shall not include
large areas of uninhabited, rural or farm lands, but it shall be urban in nature.”); W. VA. CODE
§ 8-2-1(a)(2) (2020) (requiring incorporated places have an “average of not less than five
hundred inhabitants or freeholders per square mile”).
105. See MCQUILLIN, supra note 91, § 3:35.
106. Id.
107. Act of June 20, 1951, ch. 259, § 2, 1951 N.J. LAWS 906, 906 (incorporating Victory
Gardens).
108. See id.
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Incorporation by legislative fiat became unpopular in the late nineteenth
century because of the advantage it gave to powerful special interests:
individuals with connections to the statehouse had significantly better
chances of convincing a legislator to introduce a bill to spur an incorporation
than did ordinary citizens.109 Legislatures adopted more wholesale
approaches to incorporation, including enabling statutes and “home rule”
provisions.110 General enabling statutes lay out standardized pathways to
municipal incorporation that are available to qualifying groups of citizens
should they choose to pursue it.111 Some state constitutions now forbid
special legislation and require that towns be incorporated exclusively under
general enabling legislation.112
States supplement this decentralization of incorporation through home rule
statutes, which limit legislative supremacy over the internal affairs of towns
once they are incorporated.113 Home rule provisions can serve as heavy
counterbalances to Dillon’s Rule, providing municipalities or classes of
municipalities with varying degrees of power to amend their charters, decide
what government services they will or will not provide, and choose how to
generally enforce state law.114 Now, almost all states have some form of a
home rule provision.115 While home rule powers can allow a town to
significantly alter its form, potentially resulting in the incorporation of a new
municipal corporation after replacing its existing charter, these powers
cannot create wholly new towns out of unincorporated land or parts of
109. Keasbey, supra note 98, at 205 (“During all this time special charters had been freely
granted by the Legislature, and companies of every kind had been formed. The Legislature
was subjected to the influences of those who sought for special favors, and the statute books
were burdened with private acts of incorporation.”).
110. Id. (describing the majority of states’ move toward general enabling statutes); see also
Philip A. Trautman, Legislative Control of Municipal Corporations in Washington, 38 WASH.
L. REV. 743, 765 n.97 (1963) (describing how nearly half of states had enacted home rule
provisions by 1930).
111. See MCQUILLIN, supra note 91, § 3:35.
112. See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(b)(2) (“[T]he legislature . . . [s]hall have the power
to act in relation to . . . . any local government only by general law, or by special law only (a)
[by request of the town government], or (b) except in the case of the city of New York, on
certificate of necessity from the governor . . . [and] with the concurrence of two-thirds of the
members elected to each house of the legislature.”); WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 10
(“Corporations for municipal purposes shall not be created by special laws; but the legislature,
by general laws, shall provide for the incorporation . . . of cities and towns, which laws may
be altered, amended or repealed.”).
113. While municipalities incorporated under special legislation or general enabling
statutes by default have only the powers the legislature explicitly gives to them, home rule
municipalities have unlimited power to regulate their internal affairs except for what the
legislature explicitly forbids them from doing. Compare Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. City of
Sunset Valley, 146 S.W.3d 637, 645 (Tex. 2004) (“General-law municipalities . . . are political
subdivisions created by the State and, as such, possess those powers and privileges that the
State expressly confers upon them.”), with City of Davenport v. Seymour, 755 N.W.2d 533,
538 (Iowa 2008) (“[A]s long as [a home rule municipality’s] exercise of police power over
local affairs is not ‘inconsistent with the laws of the general assembly,’ municipalities may act
without express legislative approval or authorization. City authorities are no longer frightened
by Dillon’s ghost.” (quoting IOWA CONST. art. III, § 38A)).
114. See MCQUILLIN, supra note 91, § 1:44.
115. See NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, supra note 82, at 7.
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neighboring incorporated towns the way special legislation and general
enabling statutes can.116 However, no matter which method a state
government chooses to incorporate its municipalities, and no matter how
much the power seems to rest in the hands of voters, all incorporation power
continues to originate from the state government.117
III. VOID INCORPORATIONS
Regardless of how ill-advised an incorporation may seem, with so much
legislative control over the process, there are few opportunities for residents
to contest the legality of incorporations.118 State governments themselves
are often the only parties with standing to challenge an incorporation.119
While the creation of Victory Gardens unquestionably violated basic norms
of governance,120 the deference provided to states through Dillon’s Rule
makes it unlikely that such a violation would rise to the high level of being
legally void. This section explores some of the narrow, unique circumstances
under which courts have put a stop to incorporations.
Part III.A details how courts have found cause to stop a town from forming
or cease a town’s operation under various protections afforded by the U.S.
Constitution. Part III.B looks at situations in which courts have voided
incorporations under state constitutions and statutes. Part III.C discusses de
facto towns, which are the most common by-products of successful legal
challenges to incorporations.
A. Constitutional Violations
The Constitution provides protections to Americans when the land beneath
them is being incorporated. Theoretically, for example, an incorporation
statute that only opens a referendum up to male voters would likely be found
to violate the Nineteenth Amendment today,121 and a court could strike down
its resulting incorporation as void. The cases below are instances where
courts—despite the broad deference afforded to states under Dillon’s Rule—
116. See Forwood v. City of Taylor, 214 S.W.2d 282, 285 (Tex. 1948) (holding that towns
incorporated under home rule statutes are qualitatively different from those created by special
legislation or general enabling statutes, with only towns in the latter two categories considered
to be “incorporated under the General Laws” for the purposes of a Texas statute).
117. See, e.g., Pershing v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct., 181 P. 960, 962 (Nev. 1919).
118. See Lippold v. Meade Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 906 N.W. 2d 917, 922 (S.D. 2018)
(“With few exceptions, a private person cannot ordinarily, either directly or indirectly, usurp
this function of government.” (quoting MCQUILLIN, supra note 91, § 3:107)).
119. The mechanics of legal challenges to prevent an incorporation from proceeding are
beyond the scope of this Note, which instead focuses on the substance behind those challenges.
In short, quo warranto suits brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 81 are the means
for stopping a legislature from exceeding its authority to incorporate. See Detzner v. Anstead,
256 So.3d 820, 822 (Fla. 2018) (“A writ of quo warranto is the means for determining ‘whether
a state officer or agency has improperly exercised a power or right derived from the State.’”
(quoting Fla. House of Reps. v. Crist, 999 So.2d 601, 607 (Fla. 2008))).
120. See Viteritti, supra note 28, at 30–31 (describing general expectations for a legitimate
democratic government).
121. U.S. CONST. amend XIX.
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found that incorporations ran afoul of the Constitution. This section details
various provisions of the Constitution that can give rise to a void
incorporation.
1. The First Amendment: Towns as Churches
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment,122 as applied to the
states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,123
prohibits states from enacting any laws “respecting an establishment of
religion.”124 The First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause complements that
protection, prohibiting states from passing laws that compel individuals to
practice or refrain from practicing a faith.125 In the municipal context, an
incorporation can be found void if it provides a religious organization with
the coercive powers of a municipal government or effectively bars members
of a faith from participating in local affairs.126
In 1920, the New Jersey legislature recognized a seaside resort operated
by the Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Association of the Methodist Episcopal
Church as “an asset to the good name and fame of New Jersey.”127 To
support the resort, the legislature incorporated it as its own municipality and
gave it the power to police itself, with the local government notably deprived
of authority to interfere with operations.128 To keep beachgoers from
disturbing worshipers, the incorporation statute required that gates be erected
to stop all vehicular traffic in the new town “on each Sabbath day.”129 The
town government would be completely subordinate to the church.130
Initially, a state appellate court found the incorporation to be void but not
on First Amendment grounds.131 Rather, the court found it unconstitutional
under the state constitution for too closely regulating the continuing internal
affairs of the area after incorporation was complete.132 No longer a
municipality, the association continued to exert control over the
administration of the area uninterrupted.133 For decades after the ruling, the
state allowed the association to operate its own police department to enforce
resort rules with the force of law.134 Chains blocked off streets on Sundays,
122. Id. amend. I.
123. Id. amend. XIV.
124. State v. Celmer, 404 A.2d 1, 5 (N.J. 1979) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I).
125. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (“Freedom of conscience and
freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as the individual may
choose cannot be restricted by law.”).
126. See Celmer, 404 A.2d at 5–6.
127. An Act to Incorporate the “Borough of Ocean Grove, in the County of Monmouth,”
ch. 96 pmbl.,1920 N.J. LAWS 190, 190 (incorporating the borough of Ocean Grove).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. The town government would be given the power to exercise municipal control “but
without violating the religious integrity of Ocean Grove.” Id.
131. See Att’y Gen. v. Borough of Ocean Grove, 114 A. 15, 17 (N.J. 1921).
132. See id.
133. See Joseph F. Sullivan, Ocean Grove Tries to Retain Ideals, but Not Some Civic
Burdens, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1982, at 6.
134. See id.
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as planned.135 It was not until 1979 in State v. Celmer,136 when a driver who
had been arrested by Ocean Grove police questioned the association’s
authority to take state action, that courts meaningfully intervened.
In Celmer, the Supreme Court of New Jersey found the “government” of
Ocean Grove to be a blatant First Amendment violation.137 The legislature
had violated the Free Exercise Clause by “ordain[ing] that non-Methodists
cannot participate in governmental decisions” when it ceded power directly
to the association.138 The court found that the legislature’s action had run
afoul of the Establishment Clause due to its “excessive government
entanglement with religion.”139 The court held that, at a minimum, the First
Amendment “precludes a state from ceding governmental powers to a
religious organization,” making incorporations that have that effect
unconstitutional and thus void.140 An incorporation cannot lead to a situation
where “the Church shall be the State and the State shall be the Church.”141
However, the circumstances that could give rise to a First Amendment
challenge to incorporation are exceedingly rare. The most notable instance
was in the Oregon commune of Rajneeshpuram, which incorporated as a
city.142 A federal court found the incorporation unconstitutional because it
gave “sovereign governmental power to a religion and its leaders.”143
2. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments: Regulatory Takings and
Substantive Due Process
The Fourteenth Amendment generally prohibits state governments from
taking arbitrary or unreasonable actions.144 Specifically, the substantive due
process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment ensure that all state action
will have a “reasonable justification in the service of a legitimate
governmental objective.”145 Courts generally use a rational basis test to
assess whether the justification is reasonable and the ends are legitimate, but
this is “the most relaxed and tolerant form of judicial scrutiny.”146 If a court
can imagine any possible set of facts that could reasonably justify an action,
the court will not intervene.147

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

See id.
404 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1979).
Id. at 6–7.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 6 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
Id.
Id.
See generally Janice L. Sperow, Rajneeshpuram: Religion Incorporated, 36
HASTINGS L.J. 917 (1985).
143. Oregon v. City of Rajneeshpuram, 598 F. Supp. 1208, 1213 (D. Or. 1984).
144. Thompson v. Gallagher, 489 F.2d 443, 446 (5th Cir. 1973) (“The Fourteenth
Amendment is a general prohibition against arbitrary and unreasonable governmental
action.”).
145. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845–46 (1998).
146. City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 26 (1989).
147. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961).
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In the context of regulatory takings, in which courts assess if the
government’s interference with property rights is justified by a recognizable
“public use” and the government compensates for the taking, the government
only needs to meet the low bar of the rational basis test for its proposed “use”
to satisfy the Fifth Amendment’s requirements,148 as applied to the states
under the Fourteenth Amendment.149 If a court finds an attempted
incorporation to be unquestionably illogical and completely unjustifiable—
for example decreasing the value of the incorporated land without providing
any possible benefit—the court could find the incorporation to be an
unconstitutional taking and thus void.150
When the Superior Oil Company leased a spot to drill in the Gulf of
Mexico from Texas, it figured it would not be paying any municipal taxes
because it was ten miles off the Texas shore.151 Sensing an opportunity to
increase its tax base, the City of Port Arthur extended its borders ten miles
into the gulf to place the rig under its jurisdiction.152 A federal district court
found that the rig had lost value once it became taxable, and because Superior
Oil could not possibly obtain any benefit from being part of the city, the court
deemed Port Arthur’s aquatic “land grab” to be an uncompensated and thus
unconstitutional taking.153 The court found the yawning discrepancy
between the taxes to be owed and the nonexistent benefits to be conferred so
“flagrant and palpable” that it was unconscionable.154 A state court had
previously heard Superior Oil’s complaint and found it nonjusticiable as a
political question.155 The federal district court recognized the res judicata
implications of the previous ruling but entered judgment suggesting it was
the only way to prevent manifest injustice.156 The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals overruled the decision on res judicata grounds, without passing
judgment on the due process holding.157

148. U.S. CONST. amend V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.”).
149. See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242–43 (1984) (“When the
legislature’s purpose is legitimate and its means are not irrational, our cases make clear that
empirical debates over the wisdom of takings—no less than debates over the wisdom of other
kinds of socioeconomic legislation—are not to be carried out in the federal courts.”).
150. See Superior Oil Co. v. City of Port Arthur, 553 F. Supp. 511, 517–18 (E.D. Tex.
1982), rev’d on other grounds, 726 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1984).
151. See Superior Oil Co. v. City of Port Arthur, 628 S.W.2d 94, 95 (Tex. App. 1981)
(detailing facts of the incorporation).
152. See id.
153. Superior Oil, 553 F. Supp. at 517–18.
154. Id. at 518 (quoting Dane v. Jackson, 256 U.S. 589, 599 (1921)).
155. See Superior Oil, 628 S.W.2d at 96 (citing Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161
(1907)).
156. See Superior Oil, 553 F. Supp. at 512.
157. See Superior Oil Co. v. City of Port Arthur, 726 F.2d 203, 206 (5th Cir. 1984)
(overturning the lower court decision on res judicata grounds).
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3. The Fourteenth Amendment: Equal Protection at the Ballot Box
States are not required to allow for democratic participation in the
incorporation process.158 However, once they allow residents to have a say,
the voting process must conform to the requirements of the Equal Protection
The clause makes it
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.159
unconstitutional for a state to “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.”160 In elections, that means every qualified
voter’s ballot must carry equal weight.161 If a state chooses to allow citizens
to participate in an incorporation referendum, a court can deem the pending
incorporation void if the state gives one group of affected residents a
disproportionate say in the election.162
When a state imposes a “severe” restriction on the franchise, the restriction
must be “narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling
importance.”163 Restrictions that trigger such strict scrutiny usually fall into
one of two categories: (1) regulations that unreasonably limit voting for
certain residents in a geographic area in elections that affect the entire area
or (2) regulations that decrease the voting power of a class of voters and
threaten the principle of “one person, one vote.”164 When a state applies a
nondiscriminatory voting restriction that is reasonable both facially and in
effect, an “important” government interest must be found to outweigh the
burden on the right to vote—satisfying the application of an intermediate
standard of review.165 Finally, when states do not restrict the franchise at all
but rather open the vote up to arguably too many voters—diluting the votes
of the people most directly affected—they need only show a rational basis
for their decisions.166 In incorporation referenda, limiting the franchise by a
criterion other than residence, age, or citizenship must serve a compelling
state interest or else the incorporation statute will be struck down as void.167

158. See Muller v. Curran, 889 F.2d 54, 56 (4th Cir. 1989) (stating that states “need not
grant anyone the right to vote” on incorporation decisions (quoting Hayward v. Clay, 573 F.2d
187, 190 (4th Cir. 1978))).
159. See id.
160. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
161. See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963) (“[O]ne person, one vote.”).
162. This was the holding of Hayward v. Clay, 573 F.2d 187 (4th Cir. 1978), regarding an
unconstitutional annexation. Hayward, 573 F.2d at 190. Muller v. Curran, 889 F.2d 54 (4th
Cir. 1989), confirmed that the holding applies to incorporations of wholly new municipal
corporations as well. Muller, 889 F.2d at 56.
163. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S.
279, 289 (1992)).
164. Green v. City of Tucson, 340 F.3d 891, 899–900 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining the two
types of voting regulations that require strict scrutiny).
165. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983)).
166. Green, 340 F.3d at 900 (noting that when a statute calls for an overinclusive
incorporation referendum, it “discriminates between different electoral units based on their
proximity to existing municipalities, rather than between voters in any single electoral unit,”
and the Supreme Court has never applied strict scrutiny to such discrimination).
167. Hayward v. Clay, 573 F.2d 187, 189 (4th Cir. 1978) (declaring a statute
unconstitutional that limited voting to owners of taxable property).
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When Kiawah—an unincorporated area on the South Carolina coast—
attempted to become incorporated into the neighboring City of Charleston,
the state set up two ballot boxes in each polling place for a referendum.168
The first box was for all registered voters who lived in Charleston and
Kiawah to vote for or against the annexation.169 The second box was only
for people who owned freehold estates in Kiawah.170 Before or after casting
one vote in the box with everyone else, these landowners could cast a ballot
in the second box for each separate piece of land they owned in the area.171
For the incorporation to proceed, a majority of the votes in both boxes needed
to be in favor of the change.172
The Fourth Circuit found that giving certain residents second, third, or
even additional votes in an election violates the Equal Protection Clause.173
The U.S. Supreme Court has approved of limiting voting to certain classes
of residents only in matters of “special interest,” which are highly specific
issues that disproportionately affect a definite group within a geographic
area.174 However, the creation of a town is a “matter of general interest” that
affects everyone who lives within the area to be incorporated, whether they
own land or not.175 Everyone living within a town’s borders is affected by
changes to the local government or the municipal services it provides, so the
electorate cannot be restricted in elections on those general matters.176
4. The Fifteenth Amendment: Dividing by Race
Perhaps the clearest and best known constitutional intervention in
municipal affairs came in Gomillion v. Lightfoot.177 The Gomillion Court
found that the protections of the Fifteenth Amendment178 could readily
overcome not only states’ judicial leeway in boundary making but also other
provisions in the Constitution.179 The Fifteenth Amendment ensures that
“[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude.”180 The Court stated that when a legislature
“singles out a readily isolated segment of a racial minority for special
168. See id.
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. See id. at 189 n.2.
172. See id. at 189.
173. Id. at 190.
174. Id. (allowing local landowners to elect the board of an irrigation district). But see Rice
v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 499 (2000) (finding that Hawaii could not limit an election to pick
the trustees for an agency that supports Native Hawaiians exclusively to Native Hawaiian
voters under the Fifteenth Amendment).
175. Hayward, 573 F.2d at 190.
176. See id.
177. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
178. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
179. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 345 (“[T]he constitutional protection of contracts . . . extensive
though it is, is met and overcome by the Fifteenth Amendment . . . .”).
180. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
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discriminatory treatment” and that discrimination limits the group’s right to
vote, it violates the Fifteenth Amendment.181 If a state uses a boundary
change to take “the municipal franchise and consequent rights” from a racial
minority population, the statute effecting the change is void.182
Throughout its history, Tuskegee, Alabama, has been recognized for its
intellectual, middle-class Black population affiliated with the local Tuskegee
University—including residents like Booker T. Washington and George
Washington Carver183—and the legendary heroics of the Tuskegee
Airmen.184 In 1960, alarmed by a successful voter registration drive within
Tuskegee’s Black neighborhoods,185 the Alabama legislature made a naked
attempt to deprive the local Black community of its ability to influence local
affairs.186 The legislature redrew the municipality’s boundaries from an
ordinary square to a smaller, bizarre, twenty-eight-sided shape.187 The areas
it removed from the original square included the homes of approximately 395
of Tuskegee’s 400 Black voters.188 No longer part of Tuskegee, the Black
neighborhoods were to be returned to unincorporated status to blend in with
the rest of rural Macon County, which was home to a poorer Black
population.189
At no point did Alabama cite a single government function that would be
improved by the change.190 Instead, the state made a Dillon’s Rule argument,
convincing the district court to hold that federal courts have no say
whatsoever over the boundary changes that legislatures make, regardless of
their constitutional implications.191 The Supreme Court overruled the Fifth
Circuit, finding that courts had frequently misinterpreted dicta in Hunter v.
City of Pittsburgh192 and its progeny to mean that Dillon’s Rule left no room
for even the Supreme Court to check incorporations.193 It is the role of courts
181. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 346.
182. Id. at 347; see also id. at 344.
183. See Alabama:
Butler Chapel AME Zion Church, NAT’L PARK SERV.,
https://www.nps.gov/places/alabama-butler-chapel-ame-zion-church.htm
[https://perma.cc/GHZ4-VAG9] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021) (describing Tuskegee’s Black
middle-class
population);
see
also
Tuskegee,
ENCYC.
BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/place/Tuskegee-Alabama [https://perma.cc/C6QZ-VPZ6] (last
visited Jan. 27, 2021) (discussing Tuskegee’s notable Black residents).
184. See Tuskegee Airmen, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/
topic/Tuskegee-Airmen [https://perma.cc/TH2D-M3VU] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021)
(discussing the first Black flying unit in the U.S military, which trained in Tuskegee and was
highly decorated for its achievements in World War II).
185. See Robert Mcg. Thomas Jr., Charles Gomillion, 95, Figure In Landmark Remap
Case, Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1995, at B22.
186. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 347 (calling the boundary change incidental to the desired
disenfranchisement).
187. See id. at 341.
188. See id.
189. See Alabama: Butler Chapel AME Zion Church, supra note 183 (describing the
Macon County population).
190. See Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 342.
191. See id. at 340–41 (quoting Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 167 F. Supp. 405, 410 (M.D. Ala.
1958)).
192. 207 U.S. 161 (1907).
193. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 343–44.
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to put a stop to violations of the Constitution when they arise, and as the
Court succinctly put it: “[a] statute which is alleged to have worked
unconstitutional deprivations of . . . rights is not immune to attack simply
because the mechanism employed by the legislature is a redefinition of
municipal boundaries.”194
The Court mentioned how the state’s action created due process and equal
protection problems early in its opinion, but only Justice Charles Whittaker’s
concurrence analyzed either of those concerns.195 Justice Whittaker argued
that the case should be decided on equal protection grounds because the
Black voters had not lost their “right . . . to vote,” as a Fifteenth Amendment
violation requires, since they could still vote in county elections.196 The
majority felt the right to vote protected by the Fifteenth Amendment extends
beyond the right to cast a ballot somewhere and includes the benefits that
accrue to citizens when their government is properly accountable to them at
the ballot box.197
B. State Law Procedural Requirements
In addition to the federal constitutional protections available to individuals
during incorporations, state constitutions and laws lay out mandatory
procedures for incorporation to bring some order and limits to the process.
If a state lays down an absolute requirement for forming a municipality—
such as a minimum population before a place can be incorporated—and an
incorporation effort fails to satisfy that requirement, a court can deem the
incorporation void.198
This section uses the case of Durham v. Crutchfield,199 in which a Texas
state court gave a comprehensive outline of how incorporations can be void
under state law,200 to structure its analysis. The court acknowledged that it
would be extraordinarily difficult to identify every set of circumstances that
could render an incorporation void,201 but those circumstances generally fall
into three broad categories: (1) incorporations that violate provisions in a
state’s constitution, (2) incorporations that are expressly prohibited by a state
statute, and (3) incorporations that utterly fail to meet statutory
requirements.202

194. Id. at 347.
195. See id. at 349 (Whittaker, J., concurring).
196. Id.
197. Id. at 347 (majority opinion) (finding that Alabama had “deprived the petitioners of
the municipal franchise and consequent rights,” without defining “consequent rights” further
(emphasis added)).
198. See Durham v. Crutchfield, 578 S.W.2d 438, 440–41 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979)
(describing circumstances under which state governments and citizens can challenge
incorporations before courts).
199. 578 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
200. See id. at 441.
201. See id.
202. See id.
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1. Incorporation Violates the State Constitution
Part II.A described how legislatures cannot delegate the power to
incorporate to the courts, the executive branch, or the people themselves.
Incorporations that result from such improper delegations are void, but
incorporation statutes can also be void even if no improper third party
exercises power.203 This was the case when Victory Gardens’s neighbor,
Dover, was in the gradual process of breaking away from Randolph and
attempted to incorporate as a city in the 1800s.204 The New Jersey Supreme
Court disapproved of the enabling statute under which Dover became its own
city, indicating that a substantial deviation from the usual legislative process
authorized by a given state’s constitution can cause an incorporation to
fail.205
In 1895, the New Jersey legislature passed a law that would automatically
change a municipality’s corporate structure as its population grew and hit
new benchmarks.206 When a town reached a population of 5000, its
corporate structure changed to that of a city, and more government positions
would be required to be voted on by the public.207 More structural changes
took place when the population hit 10,000, and at 12,000, the city could start
issuing bonds.208 The court found that such close and continuing regulation
of the internal affairs of municipalities was repugnant to the state
constitution’s ban on “private, local, or special laws,”209 the same issue that
was dispositive in initially dissolving Ocean Grove.210 Dover’s defunct
incorporation shows that states can include in their state constitutions any
manner of limitations on legislative power in municipal incorporation, and
courts must respect those limits.
2. Incorporation Is Expressly Prohibited by Statute
Within the parameters set by their constitutions and the U.S. Constitution,
states can enact statutes that set the procedure by which municipalities are
incorporated and the conditions that allow for incorporation.211 The second
category of incorporations found void under state law includes those in which
a state sets an absolute procedural requirement or condition precedent to

203. See State ex rel. Grey v. Mayor of Dover, 40 A. 640, 642 (N.J. 1898) (finding the
legislature’s attempt to incorporate under a new enabling statute to be an “invalid exercise of
legislative power,” making the incorporation void).
204. See id. at 640.
205. See id. at 643.
206. See id. at 641.
207. See id.
208. See id. at 641–42.
209. Id. at 645.
210. See State v. Celmer, 404 A.2d 1, 5–6 (N.J. 1979) (discussing why the original
incorporation of Ocean Grove was void).
211. See MCQUILLIN, supra note 91, § 3:35.
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incorporation and an attempted incorporation fails to meet that
specification.212
Some common procedural requirements for incorporation include
completing a petition that earns the support of a given percentage of residents
or landowners,213 selecting a corporate name,214 selecting precise metes and
bounds,215 and earning approval by referendum.216 Common conditions that
must be met for incorporation include that the area be contiguous217 and that
the population have a minimum number of residents218 or density.219
Finding an incorporation void for statutory violations is not as factintensive of an endeavor as finding one void for unconstitutionality. If the
statutory requirement is absolute and is not met, no municipality is formed.
When thirty out of sixty voters in an Alaskan incorporation referendum voted
in favor of creating a utility district but a statute required a majority of voters
needed to approve, a court had no problem finding that no valid incorporation
had taken place.220 The judicial inquiry in these cases only becomes
complicated where a statute sets an absolute constraint but does so in unclear
language, requiring the court to give the statute a fair construction in line
with the legislature’s perceived intentions. One troubling example of this
kind of interpretation comes from a different Alaskan incorporation battle—
one in which locals attempted to incorporate an area known as Haines
Mission in the early twentieth century.221
Before Alaska was a state, Congress alone had the power to incorporate
municipalities in the territory.222 Congress passed a law allowing any 300
permanent inhabitants of an area in Alaska to incorporate a town to manage
their affairs.223 Haines Mission residents met that requirement, collecting
212. See Durham v. Crutchfield, 578 S.W.2d 438, 441 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (stating that
an incorporation is “absolutely void” if “the act of incorporation itself was either prohibited
or unauthorized by law”).
213. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 36-5-1-2(a) (2020) (requiring 10 percent of local landowners to
sign a petition); VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-3600 (2021) (requiring one hundred local registered
voters to sign); WASH. REV. CODE § 35.02.020 (2020) (requiring 10 percent of local registered
voters to sign); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 15-1-204(a) (2020) (requiring a majority of local voters
to sign).
214. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-101(D) (2020); COLO. REV. STAT. § 31-2101(1)(c) (2021); UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-2a-208(2)(c) (LexisNexis 2019).
215. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-02-03 (2019); WASH. REV. CODE § 35.02.030; WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 15-1-202(a)(i).
216. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 11-41-2(c) (2020); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 15-1-205(b)(i).
217. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 5-1-30(A)(4) (2020); UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-2a201.5(1)(a)(i) (providing an exception for small discontinuities under subsection (c)(ii)).
218. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 50-101 (2020) (requiring at least 125 registered voters in an
area to be incorporated); MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-2-4103(1)(a) (2019) (requiring 300
inhabitants); NEV. REV. STAT. § 265.010 (2020) (requiring one thousand inhabitants).
219. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 5-1-30(A)(1) (requiring 300 residents per square mile);
W. VA. CODE § 8-2-1(a)(2) (2020) (requiring 500 residents per square mile).
220. Pac. Am. Fisheries v. Gronn, 103 F. Supp. 405, 406 (D. Alaska 1952) (“[T]he vote
was a tie. Since the statute requires a majority for incorporation, it follows that the district
was not validly created.”).
221. See In re Incorporation of Haines Mission, 3 Alaska 588 (1908).
222. See id. at 594.
223. Id. at 592.
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368 signatures on a petition.224 The problem was that only 216 of the
signatories were white; the other 152 were Alaska Natives.225 The presiding
judge was apologetic in striking down the incorporation, admitting that the
decision was at odds with the paternalistic modus operandi the U.S.
government had in its dealings with Native populations; the government
called for them to become civilized and here, they wanted to form a
government but were not allowed to do so.226 The court stated that allowing
Alaska Natives to be counted would mean, theoretically, any 300 Alaska
Natives could form a municipality without any white men present and that
surely was not what Congress envisioned when it passed its incorporation
statute.227 Even though some Alaska Natives had already earned U.S.
citizenship and many white Alaskans who regularly voted were not
citizens,228 the court felt it had to interpret the absolute statutory requirement
to give it the meaning the legislature intended.229
3. Incorporation Materially Fails to the Follow Statute
The final category includes those in which no state law was violated on its
face but rather the state’s attempt to comply with the law was so “utterly
lacking or defective” in practice that a court is compelled to strike it down.230
The issue in Durham concerned an error in the metes and bounds described
in an incorporation referendum, which left a gap in the municipality’s
proposed borders in clear contravention of a Texas law requiring a municipal
corporation to have one, continuous boundary.231 Because voters could
almost completely ascertain where the planned municipality would begin and
end, the court found the description to be in “substantial compliance” with
statutory requirements and therefore excusable.232 Any manner of statutory
violation could cause an incorporation to be void if it is wantonly or
carelessly harmful enough.233 This section focuses on one type of statutory
requirement in which courts are clearly given discretion to assess the severity
of a violation: reasonableness statutes.
It is common for states to pass some form of a statute that requires changes
in municipal boundaries to be reasonable.234 How “reasonableness” is
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. See id. at 595.
227. See id. at 596.
228. See id. at 592–93.
229. Id. at 595.
230. Durham v. Crutchfield, 578 S.W.2d 438, 441 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
231. Id.
232. Id. at 442.
233. See supra Part III.B.2.
234. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 80.020 (2020) (requiring incorporations be “reasonable”
but providing no context for interpreting what the legislature finds reasonable); .N.Y. GEN.
MUN. LAW § 712(1) (McKinney 2021) (requiring that an annexation be found to be in the
“over-all public interest”); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 21-1-17 (2021) (“If the chancellor finds from
the evidence that the proposed incorporation is not reasonable and is not required by the public
necessity and convenience, then a decree shall be entered denying such incorporation.”).
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defined varies from state to state: for example, Mississippi courts have
developed an elaborate fourteen-part test,235 while nearby Florida’s courts
use much broader criteria.236
The attempted incorporation of NASCAR’s Pocono Raceway in
Pennsylvania in 1992 highlights the broad discretion that reasonableness
statutes can afford to state courts.237 The raceway owners, the Mattioli
family, made no attempt to hide that the municipality would be dominated
by the track, proposing it be given the corporate name of “Borough of Pocono
Raceway.”238 There were only a few homes within the proposed onethousand-acre corporate boundaries—most of which were occupied by
members of the Mattioli family239—but the Mattiolis had plans to allow
developers to build up to 234 single-family homes on 130 of the acres.240
The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the proposal in In re
Incorporation of Borough of Pocono Raceway.241
A Pennsylvania appellate court had recently clarified the judiciary’s power
to check unreasonable incorporations in In re Incorporation of Borough of
Glen Mills242 when it refused to give a private school its own municipality.
Although no statute explicitly required it, the court found that a proposed
municipality must form “a harmonious whole” to be found reasonable.243
The Pocono Raceway court quoted a concern expressed by the Glen Mills
court:
[H]ow far would it go: colleges, universities, sundry institutions,
corporations, larger land owners, perhaps smaller too, would break-off at
will from Townships and into multi-separate boroughs. Each borough
going its own way to create a mix of perhaps harmonious, perhaps
antagonistic, but incongruous zoning or development patterns, and as well

235. See City of Jackson v. Byram Incorporators, 16 So. 3d 662, 675 (Miss. 2009) (listing
factors including “(1) whether a proposed area has definite characteristics of a village . . . (4)
whether there [have] been any financial commitments toward incorporation or annexation
proceedings . . . (8) whether a community has a separate identity . . . (13) whether an estimated
tax base of proposed area will support incorporation; and (14) whether the overall welfare of
residents of [the] affected area is improved by incorporation” (second and fourth alterations
in original) (quoting City of Pascagoula v. Scheffler, 487 So. 2d 196, 201–02 (Miss. 1986))).
236. See Ammons v. Dade City, 594 F. Supp. 1274, 1299 n.23 (M.D. Fla. 1984) (finding
reasonableness where there is a sufficient population to warrant local service provision, the
area is not too large for the population therein, and an appreciable community of interest exists
in the area to be incorporated); see also State ex rel. Landis v. Town of Boynton Beach, 177
So. 327, 329 (Fla. 1937) (finding that incorporations in Florida must be “necessary or
desirable”).
237. See generally In re Incorporation of Pocono Raceway, 646 A.2d 6 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1994).
238. Id. at 8.
239. Id. at 9.
240. Id. at 8.
241. 646 A.2d 6 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994).
242. 558 A.2d 592 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989).
243. Id. at 594 (quoting Bear Creek v. Penn Lake Park, 340 A.2d 642, 645 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1975)).
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conflicting and often inconsistent services. The potential for exclusion,
exploitation and overreaching becomes real and ever present.244

The court struck down the raceway’s proposed incorporation, citing its fear
that the Mattiolis would have a local government all their own; the court
echoed a lower court observation that “[t]his concentration of political power
among a small family group has great potential for misconduct. . . . The
proposed borough casts shadows of an old company town in modern
dress.”245 Where the court detected imminent injustice—a power grab to be
achieved
through
municipal
boundary
making—Pennsylvania’s
reasonableness requirements allowed it to intervene.
C. Voidable Incorporations: De Facto Towns
When a court finds an incorporation void for one of the above reasons, an
illegitimate municipality does not automatically disappear at the sound of the
judge’s gavel. If the legal challenge comes early enough in the incorporation
process that no municipal government has yet formed—such as in the failed
incorporations of Haines Mission246 and Pocono Raceway247 above—the
process stops and municipal boundaries remain unchanged. If the successful
challenge comes after a local government is up and running, however, the
unlawful municipality is designated as a de facto municipal corporation.248
A de facto municipality has all the powers of a de jure municipal corporation
until the state government intervenes and shuts it down through a quo
warranto proceeding.249 For this reason, the driver who was arrested by the
unconstitutional church police department in Ocean Grove was still liable,
even though the court found that the police department itself was
illegitimate.250

244. Pocono Raceway, 646 A.2d at 12 (alteration in original) (quoting Glen Mills, 558 A.2d
at 595).
245. Id. at 9 (second alteration in original) (quoting Morgan County Court of Pleas opinion
below dismissing incorporation petition).
246. See supra Part III.B.2.
247. See supra Part III.B.3.
248. In a majority of jurisdictions, a de facto corporation results from incorporations that
either were unconstitutional or violated a procedural law. See 1 JOHN MARTINEZ, LOCAL
GOVERNMENT LAW § 8:25 (2020). In the Oklahoma Territorial Supreme Court’s opinion in
City of Guthrie v. Territory, 31 P. 190 (Okla. 1892), and a minority of other jurisdictions, a de
facto corporation must proceed from a constitutional statute. See Guthrie, 31 P. at 192 (“A de
facto corporation cannot exist where there is no law authorizing a de jure corporation.”).
249. West v. Town of Lake Placid, 120 So. 361, 365 (Fla. 1929) (“Being a de facto
municipality, its existence can be challenged only by the state in a direct proceeding, such as
quo warranto . . . . Until its existence is so challenged and terminated by judgment of ouster,
such municipality may continue to exercise its powers and discharge its governmental
functions, and those acts must be respected by the public.”).
250. See State v. Celmer, 404 A.2d 1, 7 (N.J. 1979) (“[M]atters which have been finally
disposed of in Ocean Grove Municipal Court and are not presently pending judicial review
cannot be relitigated, nor can entries of judgments pertaining thereto be collaterally
attacked.”).
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There are three minimum requirements for creating a de facto
municipality. First, a valid statute must authorize the incorporation.251
Second, a state or a community must make a bona fide attempt to organize a
municipality under that statute.252 Third, the resulting local government
must carry out “an actual good faith exercise of corporate powers.”253 Those
corporate powers include the right to levy taxes, enter into contracts, and do
anything else a de jure municipality could do.254 Whether or not a state
abides by the requirements of its constitution and laws when incorporating
an area, the result is practically the same: a municipal government is given
power.
Even when a state does choose to dissolve a de facto municipality—
recognizing a court’s decision that an incorporation was void and seeking to
correct the error—there may be further hindrances to undoing the
incorporation. The Contracts Clause of the Constitution255 prevents states
from interfering in contracts between de facto corporations and third parties,
so de facto municipalities must continue to pay off their debts even after
dissolution.256 The Contracts Clause cannot stop a court from finding an
incorporation void,257 but it can cause the effects of the improper
incorporation to linger indefinitely. If dissolving a de facto municipality
erased all of its debts, a state could quickly erect an unconstitutional town
government, have it run up debt, and then close the town down without
paying its creditors.258
A court finding an incorporation void is an unusual event.259 Yet even in
those rare instances in which a court intervenes, illegitimate municipalities
that have reached de facto status continue to employ the coercive powers of
government.260 If affected residents do not bring a legal challenge before the
wrongful incorporation is completed, they may be stuck living under the
authority of a local government that a court has explicitly found to violate
their constitutional rights.
251. See State ex rel. Bd. of Regents for Okla. Agric. & Mech. Colls. v. McCloskey Bros.,
227 P.3d 133, 146 (Okla. 2009).
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. See Payne v. First Nat’l Bank of Columbus, 291 S.W. 209, 213 (Tex. Comm’n App.
1927) (stating that a de facto city may “function as a city and . . . exercise all the powers,
duties, and franchises of such”).
255. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.
256. See Payne, 291 S.W. at 210–13 (requiring a de facto government to pay for a bridge
it built).
257. If an incorporation was unconstitutional, the fact that the illegitimate municipality
entered a contract cannot prevent a court from stopping the constitutional violation. See
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 345 (1960) (“[T]he constitutional protection of
contracts . . . extensive though it is, is met and overcome by the Fifteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States . . . .”).
258. See Young v. City of Colorado, 174 S.W. 986, 997 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915) (“[A] de
facto municipal corporation cannot urge the invalidity of its incorporation as a defense in a
suit to collect a debt which it has contracted.”).
259. See supra Parts III.A–B, IV.A.
260. See 1 MARTINEZ, supra note 248, § 8:25 (“A de facto local government unit possesses,
generally, the same powers and responsibilities it would have if it were de jure . . . .”).
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IV. INSUFFICIENT PROTECTIONS UNDER CURRENT LAWS
A primary reason that states moved away from the creation of
municipalities through piecemeal acts of special legislation was because such
legislation gave special interests connected to the capitol outsized
influence.261 New Jersey’s nonsensical municipal boundaries, egregiously
manipulated by powerful interests,262 are among the clearest illustrations of
the dangers of a state failing to enact a clear statutory procedure for
incorporation. For example, the borough of Tavistock, New Jersey, is just a
golf course with five people living on it263 that local power brokers
incorporated in 1921; they did not like that the town it was in did not allow
them to drink on the course on Sundays, so they made the course its own
town.264 Victory Gardens stands today as an independent micromunicipality
because of a political lobbying effort led by a wealthy landowner seventy
years ago.265 The influential Tavistock golfers and Randolph’s Mr.
Brundage are all long deceased, but today’s New Jerseyans and future
generations continue to live within boundaries that they shaped to their will.
Part IV discusses the consequences of a state failing to enact uniform
incorporation statutes that are protective of the public interest. Part IV.A
looks at how likely it is that the residents of Victory Gardens could have
stopped the incorporation of their tiny project with only the state and federal
constitutions to safeguard their interests, applying the law discussed in Part
III. Part IV.B describes the kinds of protections states should include in their
incorporation statutes to ensure populations like that in Victory Gardens are
not vulnerable to abuses of political power and isolated through the
redrawing of municipal boundaries.
A. In re Victory Gardens
The people of Victory Gardens raised four procedural complaints
challenging their separation from Randolph, but none were successful.266
This section compares Victory Gardens’s forced secession to the
incorporations found void in Part III to see if any similar remedy may have
been available to the project’s residents. The Victory Gardens incorporation
transgressed democratic norms267 and seems problematic in light of the
261. See Keasbey, supra note 98, at 205 (discussing incorporation in New Jersey, which
was the predominant state in corporate law in the nineteenth century, before Delaware took
up the mantle).
262. See generally KARCHER, supra note 69.
263. See Municipalities Sorted by 2011–2020 Legislative District, N.J. DEP’T OF STATE,
https://www.nj.gov/state/elections/assets/pdf/2011-legislative-districts/towns-districts.pdf
[https://perma.cc/52P9-8BXQ] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021).
264. See Bill Duhart, The Smallest Town in N.J. (Just 3 Houses!) Is the Epitome of Home
Rule, NJ.COM (May 14, 2019), https://www.nj.com/camden/2018/05/welcome_to_tavistock_
dont_blink_youll_miss_it_coun.html [https://perma.cc/AM7T-HHYL].
265. See Geelan, supra note 42 (identifying the wealthy Mr. Brundage as the leader of the
“Citizens of Randolph” group that drove the secession effort).
266. See id. (discussing the four legal challenges Victory Gardens residents brought after
the incorporation).
267. See Viteritti, supra note 28, at 30–31.
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constitutional protections described above, but the sweeping deference
afforded to states’ incorporation decisions likely leaves no remedy available.
The First Amendment is hardly an obstacle to incorporation outside of
instances of overwhelming state-church intermingling like those in Ocean
Grove and Rajneeshpuram.268 Victory Gardens residents may have had
viable First Amendment complaints regarding Randolph limiting their right
to use a loudspeaker and assemble for public meetings while advocating
against incorporation,269 but those are not the kinds of Establishment Clause
violations that give rise to void incorporations under the First Amendment.
Even though the intention of Randolph’s government may have been to make
their town as close to all-Republican as possible—excluding those of
different political persuasions the same way non-Methodists were excluded
in Ocean Grove—such political discrimination may be nonjusticiable.270
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause may seem like a more
promising ground for a challenge due to its prohibition against arbitrary state
action, including takings.271 The sheer loss in property value that resulted
from Victory Gardens residents losing access to Randolph’s town services
and schools,272 unaccompanied by any perceivable benefits, may seem
unconscionable—uncompensated and without a rational justification.
However, courts are extraordinarily hesitant to make this kind of
judgment.273 Creating an unorthodox, tiny town may be legally justifiable
simply in the name of legislative experimentation.274 Additionally, ending
the hostility between two community factions by moving municipal
boundaries has been found to not only be rational but to be a compelling state
268. See supra Part III.A.1.
269. See Victory Gardens Asks Forum, Use of Sound Truck, supra note 56.
270. The Supreme Court recently held in Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019),
that courts can intervene in voter discrimination based on race or disruption of “the oneperson, one-vote rule” but not when strictly political discrimination is at issue. Rucho, 139 S.
Ct. at 2497. The Court quoted its 1999 decision in Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999),
that said “a jurisdiction may engage in constitutional political gerrymandering.” Id. (quoting
Hunt, 526 U.S. at 551). However, the Court failed to address the accompanying footnote in
Hunt that reads: “This Court has recognized, however, that political gerrymandering claims
are justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause . . . .” Hunt, 526 U.S. at 551 n.7 (citing Davis
v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 127 (1986)).
271. See supra notes 148–47 and accompanying text.
272. The State of New Jersey categorizes schools based on the level of advantage inherent
in their populations’ demographics, considering factors like unemployment rate, percentage
of the population living in poverty, educational attainment among adults, and median income.
The categories range from Group A (most disadvantaged) to Group J (most advantaged). The
public schools available to Victory Gardens students in neighboring Dover are in Group A,
along with Newark’s, Camden’s, and Paterson’s, while Randolph’s are in Group I, below only
New Jersey’s wealthiest and most exclusive communities in Group J. See District Factor
Groups (DFG) for School Districts, STATE OF N.J. DEP’T OF EDUC., https://www.nj.gov/
education/finance/rda/dfg.shtml [https://perma.cc/VG5U-947J] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021).
273. See Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907) (“The number, nature, and duration
of the powers conferred upon [municipal] corporations and the territory over which they shall
be exercised rests in the absolute discretion of the state.”).
274. See Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 71 (1978) (stating in dicta
that “a State is afforded wide leeway when experimenting with the appropriate allocation of
state legislative power”).
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interest,275 and the strife between Victory Gardens and Randolph residents
certainly was heated.276 Some courts have held that incorporation issues like
these are outside the Fourteenth Amendment’s protections altogether,277 so a
substantive due process argument would also have been very difficult and an
unlikely path to victory for the people of Victory Gardens.
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause may seem more
promising yet. The second referendum in the Victory Gardens story—in
which only Randolph residents could vote on whether Victory Gardens
would receive its own school district278—appears especially problematic on
equal protection grounds. If there is a special interest at stake that could
justify limiting the franchise to a class of voters in that election, it seems
logical that the residents who would live within the new proposed school
district would belong to that class, not the residents whose children would
stay in Randolph schools.279 Typically, courts find it rational to restrict the
franchise to residents of the area directly at issue in a referendum,280 but what
took place in Victory Gardens was the exact opposite. The Supreme Court
has noted that where it has found local elections to be unconstitutional on
equal protection grounds, in each case the state denied the franchise to voters

275. See Moorman v. Wood, 504 F. Supp. 467, 475 (E.D. Ky. 1980) (finding a compelling
state interest where border disputes “were tearing the community apart and generating hostility
to such a degree that some solution had to be found”).
276. See Jersey Township Seeking ‘Divorce,’ supra note 38.
277. See, e.g., Raintree Homeowners Ass’n v. City of Charlotte, 543 F. Supp. 625, 629
(W.D.N.C. 1982) (interpreting the holding in Hunter to mean that “challenges to annexations
generally are not actionable under the Fourteenth Amendment”); State ex rel. Wood v. City of
Memphis, 510 S.W.2d 889, 892 (Tenn. 1974) (“[I]n annexation cases there is no equal
protection or due process argument that can properly be made when the statute is properly
followed.”).
278. See supra Part I.
279. At the time of Victory Gardens’s creation, a New Jersey statute provided that
whenever a town split into multiple towns, the residents of either new town could elect to
divide existing school districts to correspond with the new municipal boundaries. The
legislature amended the law two years after Victory Gardens’s removal—perhaps after seeing
how constitutionally problematic it could be in practice—to make any such changes
reviewable by a state board upon residents’ request. Only divisions that did not lead to
segregation or other unfair consequences would be approved. See Alfred Vail Mut. Ass’n v.
Borough of New Shrewsbury, 274 A.2d 801, 805 n.5 (N.J. 1971) (“Although L.1953, c. 417,
which superceded R.S. 18:5–2, permits the breakup of a school district originally coterminous
with one municipality where that municipality is subsequently subdivided into two corporate
entities, the municipality attempting to split the district must initially secure the approval of a
statutory board of review which includes the State Commissioner of Education before it will
be allowed to submit the issue to its electorate.”).
280. See Broyles v. Texas, 618 F. Supp. 2d 661, 687 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (“There are a number
of rational bases for a municipal voting scheme that restricts the vote to its residents, even if
nonresident property owners will be affected by some of the decisions made by the
municipality. Residents ‘have a greater individual interest in the development and welfare of
the town than do nonresidents. They have a greater personal knowledge of the city’s
conditions, and, as inhabitants, they have a greater personal stake in the city’s welfare and
progress, including the growth of its schools and other institutions.’” (quoting Massad v. City
of New London, 652 A.2d 531, 538 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1993))).
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who were “physically resident within the geographic boundaries of the
governmental entity concerned.”281
The incorporation of Victory Gardens itself, however, appears less
objectionable in terms of equal protection. The potential problem was one
of overinclusion: including so many voters who would not live in Victory
Gardens to dilute the local residents’ proportional influence over the
outcome.282 Victory Gardens voters were so outnumbered that if they had
unanimously opposed the incorporation, they would have only forestalled
their forced secession by a margin of six votes.283 Despite this apparent
unfairness, the inclusion of Randolph voters would likely only need to have
a rational basis to be acceptable. No Victory Gardens resident was kept from
voting and—unlike in Kiawah284—every voter had the same power at the
ballot box, so neither strict nor intermediate scrutiny applies.285 Since courts
are so deferential to states in incorporation decisions, and it is rational for
states to be concerned with how neighboring areas feel about a proposed
incorporation, overinclusion of the type that created Victory Gardens has
been found constitutional in the name of preventing “inter-municipal
conflict.”286
The Fifteenth Amendment’s “on account of race” language287 likely
makes the remedy found in Gomillion288 unavailable to Victory Gardens
residents as well. Randolph’s mayor’s warnings about the project becoming
the area’s biggest “slum” may have been intended to stoke segregationist
impulses in the electorate.289 The local Republican-leaning newspaper
certainly attempted to do so when it printed one editorial warning of the
arrival of “barbaric hordes”290 and another encouraging locals to display
Confederate flags just days before the referendum.291 However, although
there may have been prospective segregation taking place—and the racial
disparities existing today between Randolph and its former neighborhood

281. Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 68 (1978).
282. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) (finding malapportionment between
legislative districts to be unconstitutional on equal protection grounds, stating that “the right
of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as
effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise”).
283. The referendum passed by twenty-four votes, and thirty Victory Gardens residents
voted in favor of it. See ‘Gardens’ Is Ousted, 735–711, supra note 60.
284. See supra Part III.A.3.
285. See Green v. City of Tucson, 340 F.3d 891, 900 (9th Cir. 2003).
286. Id. at 903.
287. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
288. See supra Part III.A.4.
289. See supra notes 53–55 and accompanying text.
290. America Is Scared, supra note 55.
291. Confederate Flags, supra note 55.
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certainly are shocking292—the 1951 population was all white or close to it.293
The decision was not made “on account of” the race of the project’s white
residents but rather seemed to be spurred by a combination of class divisions
and political loyalties.294 Without a clear racial division like that seen in
Tuskegee, Victory Gardens’s ouster does not appear to be the kind forbidden
by the Fifteenth Amendment.
Procedural challenges based on state constitutional and statutory
requirements appear equally unavailing. Unlike the enabling statute that the
New Jersey Supreme Court found unconstitutional in neighboring Dover, the
legislative act that created Victory Gardens took a common legal form,295 so
no similar remedy is likely to be found in the state constitution. A separate
issue may arise from New Jersey’s constitutional provision that requires that
any bill deemed “special legislation”—which is usually thought to include
incorporation statutes296—to be approved by two-thirds of both chambers of
the legislature rather than a simple plurality.297 Neither the New Jersey
General Assembly nor Senate reached the two-thirds threshold when they
voted on the act to incorporate Victory Gardens.298 However, one New
Jersey court has found that the two-thirds provision does not apply to
incorporation legislation, so precedent suggests it may be immaterial.299 The
state constitution’s only apparent check on the legislature comes in a
provision that limits Dillion’s Rule to require courts to construe statutes
liberally in favor of municipal corporations instead of the legislature.300

292. Victory Gardens’s residents are overwhelmingly Latinx. See ELLIOTT R. BARKAN,
IMMIGRANTS IN AMERICAN HISTORY: ARRIVAL, ADAPTATION, AND INTEGRATION 836 (2013).
It has the highest percentage of Colombian-born residents of any municipality in the United
States. Id. Only 10 percent of Randolph residents are Hispanic or Latinx. See Demographics,
TWP.
OF
RANDOLPH,
https://www.randolphnj.org/about_randolph/demographics
[https://perma.cc/SWF2-WQ4L] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021).
293. See Szylvian, supra note 34, at 131 (discussing how all defense projects were
segregated at the time).
294. See Jersey Township Seeking ‘Divorce,’ supra note 38.
295. Compare Act of June 20, 1951, ch. 259, § 2, 1951 N.J. LAWS 906 (incorporating
Victory Gardens Borough), with An Act to Incorporate the Borough of Chester, in the County
of Morris, ch. 67, 1930 N.J. LAWS 284 (incorporating Chester Borough out of land within
Chester Township, adjacent to Randolph to the southwest).
296. See supra Part II.B.
297. N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7, para.10 (“Upon petition by the governing body of any
municipal corporation formed for local government, or of any county, and by vote of twothirds of all the members of each house, the Legislature may pass private, special or local laws
regulating the internal affairs of the municipality or county.”).
298. See sources cited supra note 44 and accompanying text.
299. See Botkin v. Mayor & Borough Council, 145 A.2d 618, 627 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1958) (“[T]he creation or dissolution of a municipal corporation, including a school
district, did not amount to regulation of the internal affairs thereof and so a special law to such
effect was not in violation of the [state constitution].”). An appellate court later cited this
decision in ruling that the mayor of Victory Gardens did not have standing to sue on behalf of
its school-less school district because, even though it was nonoperational, it was technically a
separate corporation. See Borough of Victory Gardens v. State, No. A-6255-08T3, 2011 WL
677283, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 25, 2011).
300. See N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7, para. 11.
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New Jersey’s incorporation statute governing boroughs—Victory
Gardens’s corporate form—is unlike the more detailed statutes from other
states listed in Part III.B.2.301 Despite “Incorporation” being in the statute’s
title, it only concerns boroughs that have already been incorporated.302 Of
the required procedures and conditions precedent listed above that are
common in other states, the only one New Jersey requires in its statute is the
selection of a name.303
The Victory Gardens incorporation likely would have been void under the
statutes of many of the above states if New Jersey had similar laws. For
example, there was a contiguity issue because the state allowed Randolph to
keep a small triangle of land near a brook in the middle of Victory Gardens,
thus breaking Randolph’s contiguity.304 Without statutes placing affirmative
requirements on incorporation efforts, however, any incorporation that is
acceptable under the state and federal constitutions is valid.
Finally, New Jersey does not have a reasonableness requirement in its
incorporation laws,305 so no similar remedy to that found in Pocono
Raceway306 is possible. If such a reasonableness requirement existed, special
interests would not have been so successful over the years at carving out
personal municipal provinces for themselves in New Jersey. For example,
an airport in the marshes of the New Jersey Meadowlands would not have
been incorporated as the Borough of Teterboro and become a municipal tax
haven for private corporations,307 specially zoned to keep out the greatest of
municipal expenses: children.308
Even if Victory Gardens residents were successful in bringing a long-shot
legal challenge after incorporation, they still would not have been allowed to
return to Randolph. Instead, they would have to be governed by a de facto
municipal corporation equal in power to the one the legislature illegitimately
gave them until the state acted.309 Considering that Republicans controlled
both chambers of the legislature and the attorney general was appointed by
the Republican governor,310 remedial legislation or a quo warranto
301. See supra notes 213–15 and accompanying text.
302. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:60-1 (West 2020) (bearing the title “Incorporation;
corporate seal; change of name”).
303. See id.
304. See Official Street Map, TWP. OF RANDOLPH, https://www.randolphnj.org/pdf/
street_map.pdf [https://perma.cc/5GBL-ZJLY] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021) (showing that the
triangle is in the northeast section of Randolph, surrounded by Victory Gardens and Dover).
305. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:43-1–66.84.
306. See supra Part III.B.3.
307. Former Assembly Speaker Alan J. Karcher called Teterboro “New Jersey’s own
Cayman Island.” KARCHER, supra note 69, at 116.
308. See Robert Hanley, The Talk of Teterboro; Tax Haven in New Jersey, in Bind, Plans
to Drop Police, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1991, at 37. (“After World War II, another developer,
Alexander Summer, forged the industrial zoning that all but prohibited housing and,
consequently, children . . . . School taxes have always been a pittance.”).
309. See supra Part III.C.
310. The governor at the time was Republican Alfred E. Driscoll. See Former New Jersey
Governors, NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N., https://www.nga.org/former-governors/new-jersey
[https://perma.cc/Z6EL-J8FM] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021).
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proceeding to dissolve the de facto corporation may have been slow coming.
New Jersey’s woeful lack of statutory protections in matters of municipal
incorporation leaves its residents vulnerable to abuse by those with the power
to curry favorable treatment from the legislature. The kinds of incorporation
requirements detailed in Part IV.B prevent states from creating towns that
will become “orphans,” as Victory Gardens did,311 both by laying out strict
conditions precedent to incorporation and including room for judicial review.
B. Statutory Solutions
Part III.A demonstrated how the Constitution can prevent states from
violating their residents’ rights through incorporation, but such judicial
interventions only come in the most flagrant situations. Unless a state has
done something truly outrageous, like given a church a police department or
removed the entire Black population from a town famous for its worldrenowned Black residents,312 the Constitution likely provides no grounds for
stopping an ill-conceived incorporation that follows statutory procedural
requirements. Therefore, substantive statutory incorporation requirements
are necessary to stop boundary changes that clearly are problematic but fall
short of a constitutional violation. Below are examples of the types of
protections and guarantees that state governments should strongly consider
adopting.
First, each state’s incorporation statutes should ensure that no municipality
is incorporated that will not be able to provide its residents with essential
public services. New Mexico has enacted a modest statute to this end,
requiring that each area to be incorporated contain a “sufficient tax base to
enable it to provide a clerk-treasurer, a police officer and office space for the
municipal government within one year of incorporation.”313 It is well
understood that there are basic government services to which all Americans
are entitled, but there is little consensus as to what they are and how extensive
they should be.314 Generally, essential local government services fall into
three categories: education, infrastructure, and safety.315 Education is
usually the domain of school districts, which are separate from town
governments, so incorporation statutes should ensure that no boundary
change will deprive residents of access to reliable infrastructure or jeopardize
their safety. A Maine statute breaks those two categories down further to

311. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
312. See supra Parts III.A.1, III.A.4.
313. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-2-2(A)(4) (2020).
314. This is especially apparent in municipal bankruptcies, when courts need to evaluate
what levels of services must survive budget cuts and liquidation. See Michelle Wilde
Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J. 1118, 1123 (2014) (“Municipal bankruptcy
and receivership laws articulate a duty to protect ‘basic public safety’ and minimum services
‘consistent with public health and safety,’ but these laws lack guidance as to what those broad
concepts mean as a practical matter.”).
315. See Michael J. Deitch, Note, Time for an Update: A New Framework for Evaluating
Chapter 9 Bankruptcies, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2705, 2729 (2015) (discussing a bankruptcy
court’s handling of Detroit’s bankruptcy).
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identify what kinds of services local governments can and should provide:
law enforcement, fire protection, 911 service, road and bridge maintenance,
solid waste management, management of polling places, local budgeting, and
animal control.316 State legislatures should assess whether any of these
services are dispensable in their communities and, if not, require that any
incorporated municipality be ready, willing, and able to provide them before
effecting an incorporation.
After the police homicide of George Floyd in 2020, the need for
democratic control over policing services came to the fore in public
discourse.317 Police should protect the people they serve and be responsive
to their needs. Responsiveness is theoretically ensured by virtue of police
chiefs being appointed by elected officials and sheriffs themselves being
democratically elected. No municipality should be incorporated if residents
there may be deprived of adequate police protection provided by a
department that is responsive and accountable to the people it serves.
Victory Gardens cannot afford a police department, and the county sheriff
does not patrol the town, so the New Jersey State Police is the primary law
enforcement agency for the municipality.318 For years, there were lapses in
patrolling when state troopers made return trips to their barracks a few towns
away to use the bathroom.319 Apparently lacking a sense of connection to or
trust of the distant state police officers, a young man with a gunshot wound
in his chest recently knocked on the door of a family friend serving on the
borough council rather than calling the police.320
A poorly policed municipality can have effects far outside its boundaries.
Victory Gardens—a veritable island of police inattention—has been home to
multiple large, interstate drug rings.321 In Iowa, an area must provide local
police services to be incorporated as a city,322 and the idea of a city relying
on state police for local patrolling is considered “illogical and

316. See ME. STAT. tit. 30-A, § 7501(1)–(9) (2020).
317. See generally Shaila Dewan & Serge F. Kovaleski, Thousands of Complaints Do Little
to Change Police Ways, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/30/
us/derek-chauvin-george-floyd.html [https://perma.cc/A9FW-Q7BY].
318. Victory Gardens made various attempts to organize and maintain a small police
department, but the town gave up in 1979 and has been patrolled by the state police ever since.
See Price Tag Doesn’t Stop Victory Gardens from Appealing to Township for Services,
RANDOLPH REP., Aug. 2, 1979, at 2.
319. See Michael Izzo, Victory Gardens Allows NJSP to Use Firehouse for Restroom
Breaks, DAILY REC., Sept. 15, 2016, at A4.
320. See Peggy Wright, Accused Shooter Pleads Guilty to Gun Possession, DAILY REC.,
Mar. 18, 2017, at A1.
321. See Katherine Santiago, Drug Kingpin Sentenced to 30 Years in Prison, STAR-LEDGER
(Aug. 7, 2009), https://www.nj.com/news/2009/08/randolph_man_rumored_to_be_hea.html
[https://perma.cc/HX7Z-V5TC] ; see also Murder of Scene’s Ex-chief Tied to Gang War Over
Dope, DAILY REC., Mar. 20, 1975, at 2 (describing the murder of a Victory Gardens bar owner
in relation to a “major cocaine ring”).
322. See State ex rel. Johnson v. Allen, 569 N.W.2d 143, 144 (Iowa 1997) (holding that a
city “must provide police protection to its residents through locally-hired police officers or
through an intergovernmental agreement” under the statute that is now IOWA CODE § 372.4
(2021)).
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impractical.”323 Other states should likewise require adequate local police
services to avoid unconscionable situations like that in Victory Gardens, both
for the sake of local residents and to prevent sophisticated criminal
organizations from finding local footholds.
Other municipal services can be equally essential and should be statutorily
required, like waste management. The Maine local services statute includes
animal control as a key service category,324 and although “dog catchers” are
often the butts of jokes because of how inconsequential they seem, Victory
Gardens residents would attest that they truly are essential. Victory Gardens
has been overrun by feral cats and dogs on separate occasions in the past, to
the certain detriment of local quality of life.325 State legislatures should
carefully consider what minimum services all municipalities should provide
and enact statutes requiring that all new municipalities be able to provide
them.
Broader reasonableness requirements also serve important functions. By
requiring that incorporation plans be authorized by a reviewing body that
gauges their reasonableness, states can stop incorporations that are arbitrary
or malevolent without rising to the high level of a constitutional due process
violation. Pennsylvania’s reasonableness requirement empowered a local
commission to stop a wealthy NASCAR track owner from getting his own
municipal playground, and it afforded the court an opportunity to review the
efficacy of that decision in Pocono Raceway.326 Such a statute would have
kept the owners of Teterboro Airport from accomplishing that very feat and
may have stopped the state from turning Victory Gardens into an isolated
pocket of underserved Democrats for the indefinite future. By providing
clear statutory minimums for incorporation and giving local commissions
and courts the power to see that those minimums are met, states can create
safeguards that ensure logical, controlled, and proficient local governance.
CONCLUSION
From Nunn, Colorado, to Victory Gardens, New Jersey, municipal
boundaries remain long after the logic behind their incorporations has faded.
When a municipality is incorporated for pernicious purposes, the consequent
inequity and disunity is institutionalized and affects generation after

323.
324.
325.
326.

Id. at 146.
ME. STAT. tit. 30-A, § 7501(9) (2020).
See Joseph Fisher, Cats Take on Tiny Town, DAILY REC., Jan. 30, 1982, at 5.
See supra Part III.C.
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generation until people inside327 or outside328 the government make a
concerted effort to change it. A state government’s incorporation decisions
are of enormous gravity, and they should thus never be made to satisfy a
fleeting political impulse.
The fact that the Victory Gardens municipal government has remained
solvent and working on behalf of its citizens, even as much better resourced
municipalities have gone bankrupt during economic downturns since World
War II, is nothing short of remarkable. The ingenuity and doggedness shown
by their councilors and mayors has been extraordinary, at times bordering on
heroic.329 Their fight for survival has been laudable, but no community
should be forced to demonstrate heroism just to fund a local budget.
If care is given to ensure that municipalities are only incorporated where
there is sufficient justification—where the change will help rather than hurt
the people who live there—public administration will become more efficient
and equitable. To ensure such care is taken, state governments should enact
laws that set clear procedures, substantive service requirements, and
reasonableness standards for incorporation. Municipal boundary making
continues to be a legal blind spot where injustice takes place outside the
purview of judicial review, and reform is necessary to keep vulnerable
communities from being abandoned in this vacuum.

327. Sometimes, the state government itself is the only party that can challenge an
incorporation, quo warranto. See W. v. Town of Lake Placid, 120 So. 361, 365 (Fla. 1929) (en
banc) (“Being a de facto municipality, its existence can be challenged only by the state in a
direct proceeding . . . .”). This was the case in State ex rel. Grey v. Mayor of Dover, 40 A.
640, 640 (N.J. 1898):
This is [a case] in the nature of quo warranto, filed by the attorney general, ex
officio, against the mayor and city council of the city of Dover, commanding it to
show by what warrant it claims to exercise, use, and enjoy the certain liberties,
privileges, and franchises of a municipal corporation.
Id.; see supra Part III.B.3.
328. The lead plaintiff in Gomillion was Charles Gomillion, a dean at Tuskegee University.
See Thomas Jr., supra note 185. He founded a small political group called the Tuskegee Civic
Association that started out doing local political organizing but ended up winning a landmark
case before the Supreme Court. Id.
329. One example is the late, longtime Victory Gardens elected official Bill Gratacos.
Gratacos was a carpenter by day and mayor by night. See Art Daniels, Former Mayor Holds
Head High Despite Adversity, DAILY REC., Nov. 13, 1980, at 15. As mayor during the difficult
economic times of the 1970s, Gratacos fought so hard for federal relief that he eventually got
a phone call put through to President Gerald Ford’s Oval Office. See The Daily Dairy of
President Gerald R. Ford (June 20, 1975) (on file with the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
& Museum), https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/diary/pdd750620.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BAZ5-VGAY].

